Voice (mbailey) MCP Server
voice-mcp
PyPI
v2.4.1
Published by mbailey — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Voice interaction capabilities for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (voice_mcp/core.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`voice_mcp/core.py:382`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run(['paplay', tmp_file.name], capture_output=True, timeout=10)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server voice_mcp/core.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (voice_mcp/shared.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`voice_mcp/shared.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: process = subprocess.Popen( ["uvx", "kokoro-fastapi"], std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server voice_mcp/shared.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (voice_mcp/tools/conversation.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`voice_mcp/tools/conversation.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: process = subprocess.Popen( ["uvx", "kokoro-fastapi"], std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server voice_mcp/tools/conversation.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (voice_mcp/tools/services.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`voice_mcp/tools/services.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: round process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subpro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server voice_mcp/tools/services.py
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ask_voice_questionno sensitive capabilitycheck_audio_devicesno sensitive capabilitycheck_room_statusno sensitive capabilityconverseno sensitive capabilityget_provider_detailsno sensitive capabilitykokoro_startno sensitive capabilitykokoro_statusno sensitive capabilitykokoro_stopno sensitive capabilitylist_tts_voicesno sensitive capabilityrefresh_provider_registryno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
voice_registryno sensitive capabilityvoice_statisticsno sensitive capabilityvoice_statistics_exportno sensitive capabilityvoice_statistics_recentno sensitive capabilityvoice_statistics_resetno sensitive capabilityvoice_statistics_summaryno sensitive capabilityvoice_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan voice-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Voice 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
Give Your Agent A Voice: x402 pay-per-call speech with 20 voices, 10 personas, 31 languages, granular speed and quality controls, OpenAI-shaped requests, and batch audio
MCP server namespace - part of HLOS ecosystem
An MCP server to allow LLMs to speak and listen via bidirectional voice loops
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