Vlm Code Context — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "vlm-code-context-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "vlm-code-context-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "vlm-code-context-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (98 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"export_to_file\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"export_to_file\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "export_to_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([dump_database, restore_database, export_to_file, import_from_file, get_token_usage]) and tools that can send data out ([export_to_file, request_user_input]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "dump_database → request_user_input"
},
"evidence": "sources [dump_database, restore_database, export_to_file, import_from_file, get_token_usage] → sinks [export_to_file, request_user_input]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"dump_database",
"restore_database",
"export_to_file",
"import_from_file",
"get_token_usage"
],
"sinks": [
"export_to_file",
"request_user_input"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/dashboard/dashboard.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/dashboard.js:464`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/dashboard/dashboard.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require(\"child_process\"); try { buildHash = execSync(\"git rev-parse --short HEAD\", {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/dashboard/dashboard.js",
"line": 464,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scrum/defaults.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scrum/defaults.js:162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scrum/defaults.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; /** * Pre-build check shared by the reset_* tools: ensure dist/ matches src/ be",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scrum/defaults.js",
"line": 162,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scrum/frontend-playbook.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scrum/frontend-playbook.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scrum/frontend-playbook.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { getEnabledSkillSets, SKILL_SETS } from \"./skill-sets.js\"; /** Read one",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scrum/frontend-playbook.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/make-legacy-fixture.mts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/make-legacy-fixture.mts:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/make-legacy-fixture.mts"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import os from \"node:os\"; import path from \"node:path\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/make-legacy-fixture.mts",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/sync-skills.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/sync-skills.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/sync-skills.mjs"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from \"node:url\"; const DEFAULT_REPO = \"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/sync-skills.mjs",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"vlm-code-context-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "vlm-code-context-mcp"
},
"evidence": "node scripts/postinstall.js",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"export_to_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"export_to_file"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"export_to_file\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
},
{
"id": "flow-2",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"dump_database",
"restore_database",
"export_to_file",
"import_from_file",
"get_token_usage"
],
"externalSink": [
"export_to_file",
"request_user_input"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"dump_database",
"export_to_file"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: dump_database → export_to_file."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_sprints",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sprint_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sprint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tickets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_retro_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_scrum",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_sprint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_sprint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "advance_sprint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_retro_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "triage_retro_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "acknowledge_ticket_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_blocker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_blocker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_bug",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sync_scrum_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_ticket_to_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_vision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_backlog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plan_sprint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sprint_playbook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_sprint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dump_database",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "restore_database",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "export_to_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"export_data\""
],
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"export_to\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "import_from_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_resume_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "load_phase_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_onboarding_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_onboarding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_vision_animation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_epics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_ticket_to_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sprint_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_sprint_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "snapshot_sprint_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_dependency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_dependency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dependency_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_time",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_mood",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_token_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_audit_trail",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_recent_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_discovery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_discoveries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_discovery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_discovery_to_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_user_input",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"put_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_response",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_step_progress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_claude_output",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_claude_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_discovery_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handle_run_kickoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handle_run_retro",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handle_run_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_sprint_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_retro_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_burndown",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_time_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_mood_trends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_token_usage",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_token\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_velocity_trends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_skill_sets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reset_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reset_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reset_sprint_process",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sprint_instructions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_directory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_description",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_directory_description",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_change_reason",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "bd8e5272aea31f1f6db83245f6417a2ac4684b9380407f29fd7a12730172ca99",
"stats": {
"tools": 98,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}