Vivado MCP Server
vivado-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.25
Published by mapleleavessssssss-wq — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Vivado MCP Server — AI 驱动的 FPGA 开发助手，支持 GUI 可视化 / 子进程无头双模式，自动诊断 CRITICAL WARNING
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vivado_mcp/analysis/verilog_compile_check.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vivado_mcp/analysis/verilog_compile_check.py:281`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] try: r = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vivado_mcp/analysis/verilog_compile_check.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vivado_mcp/vivado/gui_session.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vivado_mcp/vivado/gui_session.py:545`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: attach / 外部命中路径不 spawn(_proc is None),天然跳过。 """ import subprocess import sys if
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vivado_mcp/vivado/gui_session.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_probe_then_attach.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_probe_then_attach.py:275`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: auto-alloc 空闲端口 → spawn(fake vivado 会失败抛错),关键断言 attached_external 始终 False。 """ # 起一个 fake
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_probe_then_attach.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_readme_hooks.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_readme_hooks.py:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 3. 每条命令喂 stdin JSON 实跑(shell=True,Windows 下即 cmd 语境), 返回码与输出符合预期 —— 含 bitstream-guard 的 "ask" JSON、 xdc-lint
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_readme_hooks.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_session.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_session.py:978`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "utf-8") proc = subprocess.run( [tclsh, str(driver)], capture_output=True, timeout=30 )
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_session.py
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
parse_xprnetwork egresscheck_bitstream_readinessno sensitive capabilitycompare_xcino sensitive capabilitygenerate_bitstreamno sensitive capabilityget_critical_warningsno sensitive capabilityget_io_reportno sensitive capabilityget_ip_statusno sensitive capabilityget_next_suggestionno sensitive capabilityget_pre_commit_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_project_infono sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
get_run_progressno sensitive capabilityget_timing_reportno sensitive capabilityget_utilization_reportno sensitive capabilityinspect_ip_paramsno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilityparse_bit_headerno sensitive capabilityparse_ltxno sensitive capabilityprogram_deviceno sensitive capabilityrun_implementationno sensitive capabilityrun_synthesisno sensitive capabilityrun_tclno sensitive capabilitysafe_tclno sensitive capabilityset_wave_analogno sensitive capabilityset_wave_zoomno sensitive capabilitystart_sessionno sensitive capabilitystop_sessionno sensitive capabilityverify_io_placement_toolno sensitive capabilityverilog_compile_checkno sensitive capabilityxdc_auto_fixno sensitive capabilityxdc_lintno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.25 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.3.24 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v0.3.23 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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