Vitrine3d — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@vitrine3d/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@vitrine3d/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@vitrine3d/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 86,
"threatScore": 93,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 1.2,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/login.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/login.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/login.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from \"node:child_process\"; import { platform } from \"node:os\"; export function registerLoginTools(server, c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/login.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/login.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/login.js:46`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/login.js"
},
"evidence": "\"xdg-open\"; exec(`${cmd} \"${url}\"`); } function runLoginFlow(authState) { return new Promise((resolve, r",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/login.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (dist/auth.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (a public-by-design (anon/publishable) key — RLS, not secrecy, protects it) appears in `dist/auth.js:9`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth.js"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "dist/auth.js",
"line": 9
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "vitrine_account_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_get_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_set_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_list_hdris",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_config_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_login",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_logout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_list_looks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_apply_look",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_create_look",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_list_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_upload_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_model_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_delete_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_publish",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vitrine_get_embed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a20e27025c1534dd1b27360627c7f8a4a600b958bf93998b1760a3a1e14a7fb1",
"stats": {
"tools": 17,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}