Vite (vitejs) MCP Server

In the server's implementation (`dist/node/chunks/node.js:3496`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: \n//# sourceURL=[worker-eval(artichokie)]")}`; const viteSsrDynamicImport = "__vite_ssr_dynamic_import__"; const stackBl

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/node/chunks/node.js

The implementation builds shell commands out of runtime values AND evaluates runtime values as code. Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code.

Fix: Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.

Location: server implementation

In the server's implementation (`dist/node/chunks/node.js:2975`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: lue(rawValue) { return new Function(` var console, exports, global, module, process, require return (\n${rawVal

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/node/chunks/node.js

In the server's implementation (`dist/node/chunks/node.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: , execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { promises } from "node:dns"; import { isatty } from "node:tty"; import p

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/node/chunks/node.js

In the server's implementation (`dist/node/chunks/node.js:26168`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const yarnCacheDir = execSync(`yarn config get ${execSync("yarn config get enableGlobalCache", { cwd }).toString().tr

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/node/chunks/node.js

In the server's implementation (`dist/node/chunks/node.js:3779`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: Import = (specifier) => import(specifier); const args = [ ...declareRequire ? [createRequire(import.meta.url)] : []

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/node/chunks/node.js

In the server's implementation (`dist/node/module-runner.js:772`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ry { await runner.import(url); } catch (err) { if (runner.isClosed()) break; err.code !== "ERR_OU

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/node/module-runner.js