Visual Ui Debug Agent MCP Server

visual-ui-debug-agent-mcp npm v1.1.0

Published by samihalawa — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

VUDA: Visual UI Debug Agent - An autonomous MCP for visual testing and debugging of user interfaces

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 5

high Tool "playwright_evaluate" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "playwright_evaluate" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool playwright_evaluate

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([sitemap_crawler]) co-exist with external-action tools ([playwright_evaluate]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [sitemap_crawler] → sinks [playwright_evaluate]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow sitemap_crawler → playwright_evaluate

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "sitemap_crawler"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "sitemap_crawler" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool sitemap_crawler · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "playwright_evaluate"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "playwright_evaluate" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool playwright_evaluate · inputSchema.properties.script

low Mutating tool "playwright_evaluate" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "playwright_evaluate" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool playwright_evaluate

Tools 32

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • playwright_evaluateruns code / shell
  • sitemap_crawleringests untrusted input
  • api_endpoint_testerno sensitive capability
  • batch_screenshot_urlsno sensitive capability
  • Browser provider statusno sensitive capability
  • console_monitorno sensitive capability
  • debug_memoryno sensitive capability
  • dom_inspectorno sensitive capability
  • enhanced_page_analyzerno sensitive capability
  • navigation_flow_validatorno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
  • performance_analysisno sensitive capability
  • playwright_clickno sensitive capability
  • playwright_console_logsno sensitive capability
  • playwright_dragno sensitive capability
  • playwright_fillno sensitive capability
  • playwright_get_visible_htmlno sensitive capability
  • playwright_get_visible_textno sensitive capability
  • playwright_go_backno sensitive capability
  • playwright_go_forwardno sensitive capability
  • playwright_hoverno sensitive capability
  • playwright_iframe_clickno sensitive capability
  • playwright_navigateno sensitive capability
  • playwright_press_keyno sensitive capability
  • playwright_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • playwright_selectno sensitive capability
  • screenshot_local_filesno sensitive capability
  • screenshot_urlno sensitive capability
  • tunnel_helperno sensitive capability
  • ui_workflow_validatorno sensitive capability
  • Visual Debugging Protocol Guideno sensitive capability
  • visual_comparisonno sensitive capability
  • VUDA Iterative Debug Loop Protocolno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.1.0 latest A 93/100 5 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v1.0.2 A 93/100 18 1.12.1 2026-08-10

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan visual-ui-debug-agent-mcp --online

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