Viralspin — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@viralspin/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@viralspin/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@viralspin/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 86,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/assembly-adjust.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/assembly-adjust.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/assembly-adjust.js"
},
"evidence": "ipsTool = void 0; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const path_1 = __importDefault(require(\"path\")); //",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/assembly-adjust.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/carousel-video.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/carousel-video.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/carousel-video.js"
},
"evidence": "t(require(\"os\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const client_js_1 = require(\"../client.js\"); const I",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/carousel-video.js",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/explainer-index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/explainer-index.js:284`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/explainer-index.js"
},
"evidence": "> __importStar(require(\"child_process\"))); await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const ff = spawn",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/explainer-index.js",
"line": 284,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/kinetic-text.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/kinetic-text.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/kinetic-text.js"
},
"evidence": "extTool = void 0; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const path_1 = __importDefault(require(\"path\")); con",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/kinetic-text.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/video-assembly.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/video-assembly.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/video-assembly.js"
},
"evidence": "blyTool = void 0; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const path_1 = __importDefault(require(\"path\")); con",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/video-assembly.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (engine/assemble.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/assemble.mjs:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/assemble.mjs"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"node:url\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "engine/assemble.mjs",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (engine/kinetic.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/kinetic.mjs:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/kinetic.mjs"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; const ENGINE = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); const PUBLIC = pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "engine/kinetic.mjs",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/assembly-adjust.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/assembly-adjust.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/assembly-adjust.ts"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import path from \"path\"; // Adjustment tools operate on the most recent crea",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/assembly-adjust.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/carousel-video.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/carousel-video.ts:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/carousel-video.ts"
},
"evidence": "ort { spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; import { post, uploadFiles, deleteFiles } from \"../client.js\"; const IMAGE_E",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/carousel-video.ts",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/explainer-index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/explainer-index.ts:280`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/explainer-index.ts"
},
"evidence": "spawn } = await import(\"child_process\"); await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => { const ff = spawn(\"ffm",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/explainer-index.ts",
"line": 280,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (engine/assemble.mjs)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/assemble.mjs:99`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/assemble.mjs"
},
"evidence": "ts resolve. const r = spawnSync(`npx remotion render \"${entry}\" Assembly \"${out}\" \"--props=${path.join(PUBLIC, \"editDa",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "engine/assemble.mjs",
"line": 99,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/tools/explainer-index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/explainer-index.js:102`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/explainer-index.js"
},
"evidence": ".then(s => __importStar(require(s))); const form = new FormData(); form.append(\"index_id\", indexId); form.ap",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/tools/explainer-index.js",
"line": 102,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@viralspin/mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@viralspin/mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "getting_started",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3bb4d0708353445850163e5d6ad980eebcaf7e5569b1b46bc8b063b304004933",
"stats": {
"tools": 1,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}