Vigil Fraud Alert MCP Server
vigil-fraud-alert-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 2.1 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 8 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −5 | publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:734`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/services/ai.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/services/ai.ts:78`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/services/ai.ts
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"vigil-fraud-alert-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package vigil-fraud-alert-mcp
Tools 13 statically extracted from source — tags show each tool’s reach
vigil_analyze_transactionnetwork egressvigil_add_travel_planno sensitive capabilityvigil_authorizeno sensitive capabilityvigil_block_transactionno sensitive capabilityvigil_confirm_transactionno sensitive capabilityvigil_generate_reportno sensitive capabilityvigil_get_cardno sensitive capabilityvigil_get_risk_profileno sensitive capabilityvigil_list_alertsno sensitive capabilityvigil_list_transactionsno sensitive capabilityvigil_update_alertno sensitive capabilityvigil_update_card_modeno sensitive capabilityvigil_update_gpsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 90/100 | 3 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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