Vidmcp MCP Server
vidmcp
PyPI
v1.1.0
Published by dhirajlochib — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI video editing MCP server — SAM 3.1 segmentation, behind-the-subject VFX, education scenes
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/agents/rewatch.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/agents/rewatch.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-i", str(video), "-af", "silencedetect=noise=-38dB:d=2.5
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/agents/rewatch.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/bgm.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/bgm.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ffix(".env16k.wav") subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", str(wav_path), "-ac", "1", "-ar", "16000", str(tm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/bgm.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/diarize.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/diarize.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exist_ok=True) subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", str(video), "-ac", "1", "-ar", str(sr), "-vn"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/diarize.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/dubbing.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/dubbing.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (text) try: subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True) subprocess.run( ["ffmpe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/dubbing.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/loudness.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/loudness.py:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , "192k", str(out)] subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True) achieved = measure_loudness(out) re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/loudness.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/media.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/media.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.check_output( [ "ffprobe", "-v",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/media.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/process.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/process.py:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ormalize to wav subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", str(src), "-ac", "2", "-ar", "48000", str(raw
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/process.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/semantic.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/semantic.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rue, exist_ok=True) subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", str(video), "-ac", "1", "-ar", str(sr), "-vn", st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/semantic.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/speech_lock.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/speech_lock.py:128`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: + "_h264.mp4") subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", str(out_path), "-c:v", "libx264", "-pix_fmt",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/speech_lock.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vidmcp/audio/tracks.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vidmcp/audio/tracks.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ec_{path.stem}.wav" subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", str(path), "-vn", "-ar", str(sr), "-ac", "2",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vidmcp/audio/tracks.py
Tools 144
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ensure_modelingests untrusted inputget_job_statusingests untrusted inputget_review_decisionsingests untrusted inputadd_camera_movesno sensitive capabilityadd_graphicsno sensitive capabilityadd_sfxno sensitive capabilityadd_speech_infographicsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_motionno sensitive capabilityanalyze_pacingno sensitive capabilityanalyze_videono sensitive capability
Show 134 more tools ↓
apply_auto_heuristicsno sensitive capabilityapply_background_effectsno sensitive capabilityapply_cut_planno sensitive capabilityapply_depth_fog_particlesno sensitive capabilityapply_lutno sensitive capabilityapply_recipeno sensitive capabilityapply_styleno sensitive capabilityattach_narrationno sensitive capabilityaudio_tracksno sensitive capabilityauto_colorno sensitive capabilitybuild_footage_indexno sensitive capabilityclassify_contentno sensitive capabilitycolor_scopesno sensitive capabilitycompare_rendersno sensitive capabilitycompile_lessonno sensitive capabilitycompile_scene_codeno sensitive capabilitycompile_viddslno sensitive capabilitycompose_recipesno sensitive capabilitycomposite_and_renderno sensitive capabilitycompute_depth_fieldno sensitive capabilitycompute_uncertainty_fieldno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitydetect_scenesno sensitive capabilitydetect_shotsno sensitive capabilitydiarize_speakersno sensitive capabilitydraft_edit_planno sensitive capabilitydub_videono sensitive capabilityedit_audio_trackno sensitive capabilityenhance_editno sensitive capabilityenqueue_jobno sensitive capabilityensure_sam_weightsno sensitive capabilityevaluate_quality_gatesno sensitive capabilityexecute_edit_planno sensitive capabilityexport_edlno sensitive capabilityexport_multino sensitive capabilityexport_renderno sensitive capabilityexport_timelineno sensitive capabilityextract_brand_from_videono sensitive capabilityextract_clipsno sensitive capabilityflow_reproject_backgroundno sensitive capabilityfreeze_frameno sensitive capabilitygenerate_brollno sensitive capabilitygenerate_edit_variantsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_meshy_plateno sensitive capabilitygenerate_metadatano sensitive capabilitygenerate_musicno sensitive capabilitygenerate_thumbnailno sensitive capabilitygenerate_thumbnailsno sensitive capabilityget_backend_infono sensitive capabilityget_brand_kitno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilitygraph_branchno sensitive capabilitygraph_checkoutno sensitive capabilitygraph_commitno sensitive capabilitygraph_logno sensitive capabilitygraph_mergeno sensitive capabilityimport_videono sensitive capabilityinsert_brollno sensitive capabilityinstall_recipe_fileno sensitive capabilitylist_effectsno sensitive capabilitylist_graphic_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_lutsno sensitive capabilitylist_marketplace_recipesno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_opsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_recipesno sensitive capabilitylist_recipes_v2no sensitive capabilitylist_tool_packsno sensitive capabilitylive_process_videono sensitive capabilitylock_identity_across_shotsno sensitive capabilitymatch_colorno sensitive capabilitymatch_subject_lightingno sensitive capabilitymatte_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilitymine_failuresno sensitive capabilitymix_bgmno sensitive capabilitymixdown_audiono sensitive capabilityplace_scene_as_backgroundno sensitive capabilityplan_cutsno sensitive capabilityplan_editno sensitive capabilityplan_harnessno sensitive capabilityplatform_healthno sensitive capabilityprocess_audiono sensitive capabilityproject_briefno sensitive capabilitypropose_edit_strategiesno sensitive capabilitypublish_recipeno sensitive capabilityqueue_statusno sensitive capabilityrefine_alphano sensitive capabilityrefine_segment_keyframesno sensitive capabilityrender_math_sceneno sensitive capabilityrender_speech_locked_sceneno sensitive capabilityreplace_backgroundno sensitive capabilityreproject_backgroundno sensitive capabilityreview_editno sensitive capabilityreview_ui_statusno sensitive capabilityrevise_edit_planno sensitive capabilityrewatch_renderno sensitive capabilityrun_critic_ensembleno sensitive capabilityrun_edit_pipelineno sensitive capabilityrun_education_lessonno sensitive capabilityrun_fast_education_harnessno sensitive capabilityrun_intentno sensitive capabilityrun_opsno sensitive capabilityrun_quality_gated_pipelineno sensitive capabilityrun_recipe_v2no sensitive capabilityrun_talking_head_polishno sensitive capabilityrun_ultimate_pipelineno sensitive capabilityrun_viddslno sensitive capabilityscaffold_remotion_sceneno sensitive capabilitysearch_footageno sensitive capabilitysearch_libraryno sensitive capabilitysegment_multi_objectsno sensitive capabilitysegment_subjectno sensitive capabilityset_brand_kitno sensitive capabilityset_composite_realismno sensitive capabilityset_creative_profileno sensitive capabilityset_tool_packno sensitive capabilitysign_renderno sensitive capabilitysmart_cut_hesitationsno sensitive capabilitysmart_reframeno sensitive capabilitystabilize_matteno sensitive capabilitystabilize_videono sensitive capabilitystart_live_sessionno sensitive capabilitystart_queue_workerno sensitive capabilitystart_review_uino sensitive capabilitysuggest_brollno sensitive capabilitysync_audio_semanticsno sensitive capabilitytalking_head_math_lessonno sensitive capabilitytime_warpno sensitive capabilitytranscribe_and_captionno sensitive capabilitytranscribe_wordsno sensitive capabilityuncertainty_guided_refineno sensitive capabilityvalidate_recipeno sensitive capabilityverify_render_manifestno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (144 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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