Vidlens — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "vidlens-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "vidlens-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "vidlens-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 82,
"threatScore": 93,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/cli-runtime.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/cli-runtime.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lib/cli-runtime.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { commandOnPath, detectKnownClients, keyTransparencySummary, readPackageM",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/lib/cli-runtime.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/visual-report.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/visual-report.js:391`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lib/visual-report.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import(\"node:child_process\"); // Pass the path as an argv entry (no shell) so it can't be interpreted",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/lib/visual-report.js",
"line": 391,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/lib/cli-runtime.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/cli-runtime.js:280`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lib/cli-runtime.js"
},
"evidence": "execSync(`npm install -g ${pkgName}`, { stdio: \"inherit\" }); resolve",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/lib/cli-runtime.js",
"line": 280,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"vidlens-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "vidlens-mcp"
},
"evidence": "node -e \"console.log('\\nVidLens MCP installed. Run: npx vidlens-mcp setup. Start the server with: npx vidlens-mcp serve. Docs: https://github.com/thatsrajan/vid",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "recallWorkspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "findVideos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspectVideo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspectChannel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listChannelCatalog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "readTranscript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "readComments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "measureAudienceSentiment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyzeVideoSet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "expandPlaylist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyzePlaylist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "importPlaylist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "importVideos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "searchTranscripts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listCollections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setActiveCollection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clearActiveCollection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "checkImportReadiness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "buildVideoDossier",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "checkSystemHealth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "removeCollection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scoreHookPatterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "researchTagsAndTitles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compareShortsVsLong",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recommendUploadWindows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discoverNicheTrends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "exploreNicheCompetitors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspectVideoSource",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "searchVideoSources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "searchSocialTrends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "importVideoSources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "transcribeVideoSource",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "downloadAsset",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "listMediaAssets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "removeMediaAsset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extractKeyframes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mediaStoreHealth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "indexVisualContent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "searchVisualContent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "findSimilarFrames",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "importComments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "searchComments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listCommentCollections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setActiveCommentCollection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clearActiveCommentCollection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "removeCommentCollection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "exploreYouTube",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"web_search\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "findSourcedVideos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "exploreSourcedVideos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "45b561ce7d6f1741698155781b06414e66434972f5f88b20920547fa591c0ae5",
"stats": {
"tools": 49,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}