Video Context MCP Server
video-context-mcp-server
npm
v2.2.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A Model Context Protocol server that gives GitHub Copilot the ability to understand and analyze video content
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 8 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/ffmpeg.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/ffmpeg.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'fs/promises'; import { tmpdir } from 'os'; import p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/ffmpeg.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/updateCheck.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/updateCheck.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { logProgress, logWarning } from './logger.js'; const PACKAGE_NAME = 'vid
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/updateCheck.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/updateCheck.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/updateCheck.js:59`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ((resolve) => { exec(`npm outdated -g ${PACKAGE_NAME} --json`, { timeout: TIMEOUT_MS }, (error, stdout) => {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/updateCheck.js
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_videono sensitive capabilityextract_framesno sensitive capabilitygenerate_imageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_musicno sensitive capabilitygenerate_videono sensitive capabilityget_video_infono sensitive capabilityquery_generation_taskno sensitive capabilityredact_sensitiveno sensitive capabilitysearch_timestampno sensitive capabilitysummarize_videono sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
text_to_speechno sensitive capabilitytranscribe_videono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.0 latest |
B 86/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.1.0 |
B 86/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v2.0.0 |
B 86/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.3.1 |
B 86/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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