Victron Tcp MCP Server
victron-tcp
npm
v1.5.0
Published by lubosstrejcek — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Victron Energy GX devices via Modbus TCP or MQTT
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/registers/loader.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/registers/loader.js:38`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ath) { const data = require(path); return data.categories.map(convertCategory); } const ccgxCategories = loadJso
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/registers/loader.js
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
victron_acload_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_alternator_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_battery_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_charger_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_check_onlineno sensitive capabilityvictron_dcdc_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_dcenergy_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_dcgenset_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_digital_inputsno sensitive capabilityvictron_discoverno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
victron_evcs_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_generator_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_genset_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_gps_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_grid_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_gx_infono sensitive capabilityvictron_inverter_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_list_registersno sensitive capabilityvictron_meteo_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_mqtt_discoverno sensitive capabilityvictron_multi_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_network_scanno sensitive capabilityvictron_pvinverter_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_read_categoryno sensitive capabilityvictron_read_registerno sensitive capabilityvictron_search_docsno sensitive capabilityvictron_setupno sensitive capabilityvictron_solar_statusno sensitive capabilityvictron_system_overviewno sensitive capabilityvictron_tank_levelsno sensitive capabilityvictron_temperatureno sensitive capabilityvictron_vebus_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.0 latest |
A 99/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.4.0 |
A 99/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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