Chrome Devtools (vibebrowser) MCP Server
@vibebrowser/chrome-devtools-mcp
npm
v0.26.7
Published by @vibebrowser — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Chrome DevTools MCP server with Streamable HTTP transport for multi-agent sharing
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Hardcoded Google API key in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/bin/check-latest-version.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/bin/check-latest-version.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import path from 'node:path'; import process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/bin/check-latest-version.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/bin/install-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/bin/install-service.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import process from 'node:process'; co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/bin/install-service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/browser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/browser.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/browser.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/daemon/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/daemon/client.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import net from 'node:net'; import { logger } from '..
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/daemon/client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/telemetry/WatchdogClient.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/telemetry/WatchdogClient.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { logger } from '../logger.js';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/telemetry/WatchdogClient.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/utils/check-for-updates.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/utils/check-for-updates.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : Apache-2.0 */ import child_process from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import os from 'node
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/utils/check-for-updates.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/src/bin/install-service.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/src/bin/install-service.js:22`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: md) { try { execSync(`which ${cmd}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); return true; } catch { retu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/bin/install-service.js
low Hardcoded Google API key in server code (build/src/tools/performance.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded Google API key (a public Firebase/web API key) appears in `build/src/tools/performance.js:175`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server build/src/tools/performance.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.26.7 latest |
B 86/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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