Vibe Testing MCP Server
vibe-testing
npm
v0.4.2
Source verified
Published by aishwaryshrivastav — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Code-aware browser testing agent — reads your codebase, understands functionality, tests every element, reports with screenshots. Works as MCP server for Cursor/Claude Code or standalone CLI.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×3 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 6 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:643`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); const openCmd = process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'open' : process.pl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/index.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; import path from 'path'; export class VibeTester {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; import path from 'path'; function openInBrowser(fi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:645`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'xdg-open'; exec(`${openCmd} "${reportPath}"`); logger.success(`Opened report: ${reportPath}`);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/engine/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/index.js:95`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ' : 'xdg-open'; exec(`${openCmd} "${reportPath}"`, () => { }); return { product_model: produ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server.js:17`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tart' : 'xdg-open'; exec(`${cmd} "${filePath}"`, () => { }); } const session = { config: null, productModel:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server.js
Tools 13
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cleanupno sensitive capabilityexecute_scenariono sensitive capabilityexplore_pageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_reportno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_coverageno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilityrun_convergeno sensitive capabilityrun_full_testno sensitive capabilityscan_codebaseno sensitive capability
Show 3 more tools ↓
scan_page_elementsno sensitive capabilitysuggest_testsno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.2 latest |
B 83/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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