Vertaaux MCP Server
@vertaaux/mcp-server
npm
v1.2.2
Published by @vertaaux — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server with an autonomous audit, fix, and verify loop. 38 tools for UX and accessibility audits, framework-aware patches (React/Vue/Angular/Svelte), atomic GitHub PRs, and policy-as-code CI gates.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_audit]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_schedule, create_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_audit] → sinks [create_schedule, create_webhook, delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_audit → create_schedule
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_schedulenetwork egresscreate_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressget_auditingests untrusted inputanalyze_componentno sensitive capabilityaudit_a11yno sensitive capabilityaudit_artifactno sensitive capabilityaudit_repono sensitive capabilityaudit_urlno sensitive capabilitycapture_screenshotno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
compare_competitorsno sensitive capabilitycreate_pr_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_scheduleno sensitive capabilitydiff_a11yno sensitive capabilitydiff_auditsno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilityexplain_findingno sensitive capabilityexplain_issueno sensitive capabilityformat_pr_commentno sensitive capabilitygenerate_patchno sensitive capabilitygenerate_prno sensitive capabilitygenerate_sarifno sensitive capabilityget_enginesno sensitive capabilityget_findingsno sensitive capabilityget_quotano sensitive capabilityget_scheduleno sensitive capabilitylist_auditsno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitypolicy_checkno sensitive capabilityrun_auditno sensitive capabilityrun_llm_auditno sensitive capabilityrun_verification_suiteno sensitive capabilitystream_findingsno sensitive capabilitysuggest_fixno sensitive capabilitytriage_findingno sensitive capabilityupdate_scheduleno sensitive capabilityverify_fixesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.2 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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