Accelerator — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "@verevoir/accelerator",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@verevoir/accelerator"
},
"server": {
"name": "@verevoir/accelerator"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"untrusted-input",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_card ⇒ commit_files → find_symbol. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_card → commit_files → find_symbol"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_repo_tree",
"get_card"
],
"sources": [
"read_file",
"list_files",
"get_repo_tree",
"grep",
"find_symbol",
"write_file",
"edit_file",
"multi_edit",
"insert",
"delete_block",
"commit_files"
],
"sinks": [
"list_files",
"grep",
"find_symbol",
"write_file"
],
"path": [
"get_card",
"commit_files",
"find_symbol"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_card",
"to": "commit_files",
"kind": "schema-wired"
},
{
"from": "commit_files",
"to": "find_symbol",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"list_files\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"list_files\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_files"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"grep\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"grep\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "grep"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"find_symbol\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"find_symbol\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "find_symbol"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"write_file\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "write_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"list_files\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"list_files\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "list_files"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"grep\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"grep\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "grep"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"find_symbol\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"find_symbol\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "find_symbol"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"write_file\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/card-reconcile-bin.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/card-reconcile-bin.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/card-reconcile-bin.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/card-reconcile-bin.js",
"line": 2
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/router.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/router.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/router.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/router.js",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"edit_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"edit_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "edit_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"multi_edit\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"multi_edit\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"edit_file\"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "multi_edit"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"commit_files\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"commit_files\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "commit_files"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"list_files\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"list_files\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "list_files"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"grep\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"grep\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "grep"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"find_symbol\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"find_symbol\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "find_symbol"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"edit_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"edit_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "edit_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"multi_edit\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"multi_edit\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "multi_edit"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"commit_files\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"commit_files\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "commit_files"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"write_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"edit_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"edit_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "edit_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"multi_edit\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"multi_edit\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "multi_edit",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"insert\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"insert\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "insert",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"delete_block\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_block\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_block",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"commit_files\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"commit_files\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "commit_files",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_repo_tree",
"get_card"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"read_file",
"list_files",
"get_repo_tree",
"grep",
"find_symbol",
"write_file",
"edit_file",
"multi_edit",
"insert",
"delete_block",
"commit_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"list_files",
"grep",
"find_symbol",
"write_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_card",
"commit_files",
"find_symbol"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_card ⇒ commit_files → find_symbol."
},
{
"id": "flow-2",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"list_files"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"list_files\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
},
{
"id": "flow-3",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"grep"
],
"externalSink": [
"grep"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"grep\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
},
{
"id": "flow-4",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"find_symbol"
],
"externalSink": [
"find_symbol"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"find_symbol\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
},
{
"id": "flow-5",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"write_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"write_file"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\"",
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
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