Velog Mcp Claude MCP Server
velog-mcp-claude
npm
v0.22.0
Source verified
Published by seongwon030 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Velog - draft, publish, and manage posts via Claude
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/execFileNoThrow.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/execFileNoThrow.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; export function execFileNoThrow(file, args) { return new Promise((resolve) =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/execFileNoThrow.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/delete.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/delete.js:9`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const res = await fetch("https://v2.velog.io/graphql", { method: "POST", headers: { "C
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/delete.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/upload.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/upload.js:25`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const res = await fetch("https://v3.velog.io/api/files/v3/upload", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/upload.js
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
velog_get_rssingests untrusted inputvelog_append_to_seriesno sensitive capabilityvelog_create_seriesno sensitive capabilityvelog_delete_commentno sensitive capabilityvelog_delete_postno sensitive capabilityvelog_delete_seriesno sensitive capabilityvelog_draft_postno sensitive capabilityvelog_get_commentsno sensitive capabilityvelog_get_notificationsno sensitive capabilityvelog_get_postno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
velog_get_reading_listno sensitive capabilityvelog_get_trendingno sensitive capabilityvelog_git_to_postno sensitive capabilityvelog_import_from_githubno sensitive capabilityvelog_like_postno sensitive capabilityvelog_list_postsno sensitive capabilityvelog_list_seriesno sensitive capabilityvelog_list_tagsno sensitive capabilityvelog_list_temp_postsno sensitive capabilityvelog_publish_postno sensitive capabilityvelog_search_postsno sensitive capabilityvelog_topic_researchno sensitive capabilityvelog_trend_reportno sensitive capabilityvelog_unlike_postno sensitive capabilityvelog_update_commentno sensitive capabilityvelog_update_postno sensitive capabilityvelog_update_seriesno sensitive capabilityvelog_upload_imageno sensitive capabilityvelog_write_commentno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.22.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.10.0 |
A 96/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan velog-mcp-claude --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
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