Vectros Ai MCP Server
@vectros-ai/mcp-server
npm
v0.16.1
Published by @vectros-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server exposing Vectros hybrid search, structured records, and in-perimeter RAG/document-ask to MCP-aware desktop agents (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Code, Cline, Continue, VS Code).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/cli-http.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-http.js:10871`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v", "credentials", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_dsa", ".npmrc", ".netrc", ".pgpass" ]); async
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-http.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/cli-http.mjs)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-http.mjs:10853`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v", "credentials", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_dsa", ".npmrc", ".netrc", ".pgpass" ]); async
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-http.mjs
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:10874`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v", "credentials", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_dsa", ".npmrc", ".netrc", ".pgpass" ]); async
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/cli.mjs)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.mjs:10856`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v", "credentials", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_dsa", ".npmrc", ".netrc", ".pgpass" ]); async
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.mjs
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:10887`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v", "credentials", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_dsa", ".npmrc", ".netrc", ".pgpass" ]); async
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.mjs)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.mjs:10851`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v", "credentials", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_dsa", ".npmrc", ".netrc", ".pgpass" ]); async
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli-http.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-http.js:11796`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -key.ts var import_node_child_process = require("child_process"); var import_node_fs = require("fs"); var import_node_pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-http.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli-http.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-http.mjs:11778`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { statSync } from "fs"; import path from "path"; var HELPER_COMMAND = "ve
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-http.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:11663`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -key.ts var import_node_child_process = require("child_process"); var import_node_fs = require("fs"); var import_node_pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.mjs:11645`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { statSync } from "fs"; import path from "path"; var HELPER_COMMAND = "ve
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.mjs
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
document_getingests untrusted inputdocument_ingestingests untrusted inputdocument_queryingests untrusted inputhybrid_searchingests untrusted inputrecord_batch_getingests untrusted inputrecord_getingests untrusted inputcurrent_identityno sensitive capabilitydocument_askno sensitive capabilitydocument_deleteno sensitive capabilitydocument_updateno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
folder_createno sensitive capabilityfolder_deleteno sensitive capabilityfolder_queryno sensitive capabilityfolder_updateno sensitive capabilityidentityno sensitive capabilitylist_schemasno sensitive capabilitylookup_principalno sensitive capabilityrag_askno sensitive capabilityrecord_createno sensitive capabilityrecord_deleteno sensitive capabilityrecord_queryno sensitive capabilityrecord_updateno sensitive capabilityschemasno sensitive capabilityversion_historyno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.16.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.16.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.15.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.14.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v0.13.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v0.12.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.11.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v0.10.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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