Vectora Agent MCP Server
vectora-agent
PyPI
v0.1.0rc4
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (vectora/services/ignore_validator.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`vectora/services/ignore_validator.py:74`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ".jks", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", ".ssh", ".aws", ".kube",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server vectora/services/ignore_validator.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (check_coverage.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`check_coverage.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: int("=" * 60) result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) # Extrair output output_lines = result.stdo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server check_coverage.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (run_coverage.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`run_coverage.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) # Executar result = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd="/home/user/vectora") sys.exit(result.returncode)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server run_coverage.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (vectora/ui/chat.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`vectora/ui/chat.py:139`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import os os.system("cls" if os.name == "nt" else "clear") # noqa: S605 ASYNC221 try:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server vectora/ui/chat.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/e2e/test_gemini_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e/test_gemini_cli.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["gemini", "--version"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e/test_gemini_cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/test_mcp_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/test_mcp_tools.py:328`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.Popen( vectora_mcp_command, stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/test_mcp_tools.py
Tools 14
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_url_toolingests untrusted inputweb_search_toolingests untrusted inputcall_mcp_tool_toolno sensitive capabilitydelegate_task_to_vectorano sensitive capabilityembedding_toolno sensitive capabilityfile_edit_toolno sensitive capabilityfile_read_toolno sensitive capabilityfile_write_toolno sensitive capabilitygrep_toolno sensitive capabilityingest_docs_toolno sensitive capability
Show 4 more tools ↓
list_dir_toolno sensitive capabilitymanage_retriever_toolno sensitive capabilityterminal_toolno sensitive capabilityvector_search_toolno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0rc4 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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