Veche — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "veche",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "veche"
},
"server": {
"name": "veche"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/inbound/cli/lib/hostSpawner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/inbound/cli/lib/hostSpawner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/adapters/inbound/cli/lib/hostSpawner.js"
},
"evidence": "nodeSpawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { access, constants } from \"node:fs/promises\"; import path from \"node:pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/adapters/inbound/cli/lib/hostSpawner.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/inbound/cli/lib/opener.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/inbound/cli/lib/opener.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/adapters/inbound/cli/lib/opener.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; export const resolveOpener = () => { if (process.platform === \"darwin\") {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/adapters/inbound/cli/lib/opener.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/claude-code-cli/ClaudeCodeCliAgentAdapter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/claude-code-cli/ClaudeCodeCliAgentAdapter.js:111`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/claude-code-cli/ClaudeCodeCliAgentAdapter.js"
},
"evidence": "\"claude CLI refused to spawn (errno \" + err.errno + \"). This typically",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/claude-code-cli/ClaudeCodeCliAgentAdapter.js",
"line": 111,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/codex-cli/CodexCliAgentAdapter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/codex-cli/CodexCliAgentAdapter.js:112`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/codex-cli/CodexCliAgentAdapter.js"
},
"evidence": ": \"codex CLI refused to spawn (errno \" + err.errno + \"). This typically",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/codex-cli/CodexCliAgentAdapter.js",
"line": 112,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/shared/SubprocessRunner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/shared/SubprocessRunner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/shared/SubprocessRunner.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; /** * Raised when the OS refuses to launch the binary with EPERM/EACCES. * Ada",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/features/agent-integration/adapters/shared/SubprocessRunner.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "start_meeting",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_response",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_human_turn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_human_participation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_synthesis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_meetings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_transcript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "end_meeting",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "d955ef210b6befd510a13ce5041da8f03e95b20a73769ae560b73b97e375eed3",
"stats": {
"tools": 10,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}