Vcluster Yaml MCP Server

vcluster-yaml-mcp-server npm v1.5.0 Source verified

Published by piotr1215 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Trust grade
B
88/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 88/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Minimal
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade 100 − 12.3 = 88/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−12.3 Unsafe deserialization ×5 MTC-SRC-007 permissions

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 5

medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/cli-handlers.js)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-handlers.js:186`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: yaml.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/cli-handlers.js

medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/formatters.d.ts)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`dist/formatters.d.ts:33`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: yaml.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/formatters.d.ts

medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/formatters.js)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`dist/formatters.js:17`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: yaml.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/formatters.js

medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/github.js)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`dist/github.js:140`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: yaml.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/github.js

medium Unsafe deserialization (dist/snippet-validator.js)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`dist/snippet-validator.js:172`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: yaml.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/snippet-validator.js

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.5.0 latest B 88/100 5 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: B · 88/100
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