Vast Admin MCP Server
vast-admin-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.4
Published by vast-data — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
VAST Admin MCP Server - MCP server for VAST Data administration tasks
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/vast_admin_mcp/command_executor.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/vast_admin_mcp/command_executor.py:1691`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = eval(compiled, {'__builtins__': safe_builtins}, eval_locals) return result
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vast_admin_mcp/command_executor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vast_admin_mcp/command_executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vast_admin_mcp/command_executor.py:1274`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nd result = subprocess.run( ["jq", jq_expr_unescaped], input=input_json.enco
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vast_admin_mcp/command_executor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vast_admin_mcp/data_processors.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vast_admin_mcp/data_processors.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nd result = subprocess.run( ['jq', jq_expr], input=json_str,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vast_admin_mcp/data_processors.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vast_admin_mcp/mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vast_admin_mcp/mcp_server.py:1218`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } exec(func_code, exec_namespace) # Get the function
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vast_admin_mcp/mcp_server.py
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_clone_vastno sensitive capabilitycreate_quota_vastno sensitive capabilitycreate_snapshot_vastno sensitive capabilitycreate_support_bundle_vastno sensitive capabilitycreate_view_from_template_vastno sensitive capabilitycreate_view_vastno sensitive capabilitydescribe_tool_vastno sensitive capabilitylist_clusters_vastno sensitive capabilitylist_dataflow_diagram_vastno sensitive capabilitylist_fields_vastno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
list_monitors_vastno sensitive capabilitylist_performance_graph_vastno sensitive capabilitylist_performance_vastno sensitive capabilitylist_view_instances_vastno sensitive capabilityquery_users_vastno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.14.0 | 2026-09-20 |
v0.2.3 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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