Covenant (varun-ai07) MCP Server
@varun-ai07/covenant-mcp
npm
v3.0.1
Published by @varun-ai07 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
COVENANT Protocol MCP Server — AI agent access to on-chain task marketplace
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 12.2 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×3 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 11 = 77. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/lib/verify.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/verify.js:213`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: issues.push(`${evals} eval() usage`); score -= 15; } const innerHTML = countPattern(dir, /innerHTML/g)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/verify.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auto-verifier.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auto-verifier.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, rmSync } from "fs"; import { createHash } from "crypto"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auto-verifier.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "fs"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/verify.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/verify.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync, existsSync } from "fs"; import { j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/verify.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([corven_ipfs]) co-exist with external-action tools ([corven_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [corven_ipfs] → sinks [corven_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow corven_ipfs → corven_message
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auto-verifier.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/auto-verifier.js:224`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://gateway.pinata.cloud/ipfs/${hash}`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auto-verifier.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/corven-ipfs.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/corven-ipfs.js:122`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.pinata.cloud/pinning/pinFileToIPFS", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/corven-ipfs.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/auto-verifier.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/auto-verifier.js:260`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: no prompts) execSync(`git clone --depth 1 --single-branch "${repoUrl}" "${tmpDir}"`, { timeo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auto-verifier.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:216`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e() { try { execSync(`claude mcp add --transport stdio --scope user covenant -- ${SERVER_ARGS.join(" ")}`, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/lib/verify.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/verify.js:14`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (36).slice(2, 8)}`; execSync(`git clone --depth 1 --single-branch "${url}" "${tmpDir}"`, { timeout: 60000,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/verify.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@varun-ai07/covenant-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node dist/postinstall.js || echo 'COVENANT MCP Server installed. Run: npx covenant add'
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @varun-ai07/covenant-mcp
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
corven_ipfsingests untrusted inputcorven_messagenetwork egresscorven_agentno sensitive capabilitycorven_attestno sensitive capabilitycorven_batchno sensitive capabilitycorven_bountyno sensitive capabilitycorven_cast_voteno sensitive capabilitycorven_claim_rewardno sensitive capabilitycorven_collectiveno sensitive capabilitycorven_dispute_evidenceno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
corven_encryptno sensitive capabilitycorven_fiatno sensitive capabilitycorven_file_disputeno sensitive capabilitycorven_get_disputeno sensitive capabilitycorven_governno sensitive capabilitycorven_grantsno sensitive capabilitycorven_helpno sensitive capabilitycorven_insuranceno sensitive capabilitycorven_marketno sensitive capabilitycorven_matchno sensitive capabilitycorven_multino sensitive capabilitycorven_reputationno sensitive capabilitycorven_revisionno sensitive capabilitycorven_routerno sensitive capabilitycorven_statsno sensitive capabilitycorven_statusno sensitive capabilitycorven_streamno sensitive capabilitycorven_taskno sensitive capabilitycorven_trainingno sensitive capabilitycorven_verifyno sensitive capabilitycorven_versionno sensitive capabilitycorven_walletno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.1 latest |
C 77/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @varun-ai07/covenant-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Covenant 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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