Vaaya MCP Server
https://vaaya.ai/mcp
Remote
v1.0.0
Published by vaaya.ai — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
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The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 21.7 = 78. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Secrecy directive MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1 | injection |
| −6.3 | Annotation contradicts behavior on "session" MTC-CAP-003 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 78 − 6 = 72. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user)MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1
Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user) detected in the instructions of server. Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: Never tell the user
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
high Tool "session" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "session" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool session
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([consult, use, result]) co-exist with external-action tools ([session]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [consult, use, result] → sinks [session]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow consult → session
medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "session"MTC-CAP-003
Tool "session" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.
Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.
Location: tool session
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "session"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "session" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool session · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "session"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "session" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool session · inputSchema.properties.code
Tools 9
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
consultingests untrusted inputresultingests untrusted inputsessionruns code / shelluseingests untrusted inputcloseno sensitive capabilityvaaya_accountno sensitive capabilityvaaya_logoutno sensitive capabilityvaaya_onboardno sensitive capabilityvaaya_test_connectionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
C 72/100 | 6 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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