@upload-post/mcp
npm
v0.10.0
Source verified
Published by upload-post — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Official Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Upload-Post — publish, schedule, analyze and manage social media across TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, LinkedIn, Facebook, Pinterest, Threads, Reddit, Bluesky, X and more from any MCP-compatible AI agent (Clau
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_ffmpeg_result → open_upload_studio ⇒ create_comment. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_ffmpeg_result → open_upload_studio → create_comment
Tool "submit_ffmpeg_job" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool submit_ffmpeg_job
Tool "send_dm" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool send_dm · inputSchema.properties.url
Tool "submit_ffmpeg_job" takes a command-shaped parameter "full_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool submit_ffmpeg_job · inputSchema.properties.full_command
Tool "submit_ffmpeg_job" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool submit_ffmpeg_job
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_commentnetwork egressdownload_ffmpeg_resultingests untrusted inputopen_upload_studioreads sensitive datasend_dmnetwork egresssubmit_ffmpeg_jobruns code / shellcancel_scheduledno sensitive capabilitycomment_actionno sensitive capabilitycomplete_media_uploadno sensitive capabilitycreate_media_uploadno sensitive capabilitycreate_userno sensitive capabilitydelete_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_media_uploadno sensitive capabilitydelete_userno sensitive capabilityedit_scheduledno sensitive capabilitygenerate_jwtno sensitive capabilityget_account_infono sensitive capabilityget_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_audienceno sensitive capabilityget_cached_post_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_facebook_pagesno sensitive capabilityget_ffmpeg_consumptionno sensitive capabilityget_ffmpeg_jobno sensitive capabilityget_google_business_locationsno sensitive capabilityget_google_business_reviewsno sensitive capabilityget_historyno sensitive capabilityget_job_statusno sensitive capabilityget_linkedin_pagesno sensitive capabilityget_mediano sensitive capabilityget_media_uploadno sensitive capabilityget_pinterest_boardsno sensitive capabilityget_platform_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_post_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_post_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_queue_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_reddit_detailed_postsno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityget_suggestionsno sensitive capabilityget_total_impressionsno sensitive capabilitylist_dm_conversationsno sensitive capabilitylist_scheduledno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilitymanage_autodmsno sensitive capabilitypreview_queueno sensitive capabilitypublic_reply_to_commentno sensitive capabilityreply_to_commentno sensitive capabilityreply_to_google_business_reviewno sensitive capabilityretry_postno sensitive capabilitytiktok_location_searchno sensitive capabilitytiktok_music_searchno sensitive capabilitytiktok_music_trendingno sensitive capabilitytiktok_publishing_settingsno sensitive capabilityunpublish_postno sensitive capabilityupdate_queue_settingsno sensitive capabilityupload_documentno sensitive capabilityupload_photosno sensitive capabilityupload_textno sensitive capabilityupload_videono sensitive capabilityvalidate_jwtno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.10.0 latest |
A 90/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.7.0 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.6.1 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @upload-post/mcp --online
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