Upload Post MCP Server

@upload-post/mcp npm v0.10.0 Source verified

Published by upload-post — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Official Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Upload-Post — publish, schedule, analyze and manage social media across TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, LinkedIn, Facebook, Pinterest, Threads, Reddit, Bluesky, X and more from any MCP-compatible AI agent (Clau

Trust grade
A
90/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 90/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 90/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 5

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_ffmpeg_result → open_upload_studio ⇒ create_comment. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow download_ffmpeg_result → open_upload_studio → create_comment

high Tool "submit_ffmpeg_job" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "submit_ffmpeg_job" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool submit_ffmpeg_job

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "send_dm"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "send_dm" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool send_dm · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained command parameter "full_command" on "submit_ffmpeg_job"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "submit_ffmpeg_job" takes a command-shaped parameter "full_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool submit_ffmpeg_job · inputSchema.properties.full_command

low Mutating tool "submit_ffmpeg_job" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "submit_ffmpeg_job" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool submit_ffmpeg_job

Tools 58

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_commentnetwork egress
  • download_ffmpeg_resultingests untrusted input
  • open_upload_studioreads sensitive data
  • send_dmnetwork egress
  • submit_ffmpeg_jobruns code / shell
  • cancel_scheduledno sensitive capability
  • comment_actionno sensitive capability
  • complete_media_uploadno sensitive capability
  • create_media_uploadno sensitive capability
  • create_userno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
  • delete_commentno sensitive capability
  • delete_media_uploadno sensitive capability
  • delete_userno sensitive capability
  • edit_scheduledno sensitive capability
  • generate_jwtno sensitive capability
  • get_account_infono sensitive capability
  • get_analyticsno sensitive capability
  • get_audienceno sensitive capability
  • get_cached_post_analyticsno sensitive capability
  • get_facebook_pagesno sensitive capability
  • get_ffmpeg_consumptionno sensitive capability
  • get_ffmpeg_jobno sensitive capability
  • get_google_business_locationsno sensitive capability
  • get_google_business_reviewsno sensitive capability
  • get_historyno sensitive capability
  • get_job_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_linkedin_pagesno sensitive capability
  • get_mediano sensitive capability
  • get_media_uploadno sensitive capability
  • get_pinterest_boardsno sensitive capability
  • get_platform_metricsno sensitive capability
  • get_post_analyticsno sensitive capability
  • get_post_commentsno sensitive capability
  • get_queue_settingsno sensitive capability
  • get_reddit_detailed_postsno sensitive capability
  • get_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_suggestionsno sensitive capability
  • get_total_impressionsno sensitive capability
  • list_dm_conversationsno sensitive capability
  • list_scheduledno sensitive capability
  • list_usersno sensitive capability
  • manage_autodmsno sensitive capability
  • preview_queueno sensitive capability
  • public_reply_to_commentno sensitive capability
  • reply_to_commentno sensitive capability
  • reply_to_google_business_reviewno sensitive capability
  • retry_postno sensitive capability
  • tiktok_location_searchno sensitive capability
  • tiktok_music_searchno sensitive capability
  • tiktok_music_trendingno sensitive capability
  • tiktok_publishing_settingsno sensitive capability
  • unpublish_postno sensitive capability
  • update_queue_settingsno sensitive capability
  • upload_documentno sensitive capability
  • upload_photosno sensitive capability
  • upload_textno sensitive capability
  • upload_videono sensitive capability
  • validate_jwtno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 3

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.10.0 latest A 90/100 5 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v0.7.0 A 94/100 5 1.13.0 2026-08-31
v0.6.1 A 94/100 5 1.12.1 2026-07-28

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 90/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @upload-post/mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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