Bitbucket Server (upendra_sengar) MCP Server
@upendra_sengar/bitbucket-server-mcp
npm
v0.1.0
Published by @upendra_sengar — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Bitbucket Server / Data Center with code review, cross-repo PRs, and CI insights
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: browse_repository → get_file_content → create_pull_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow browse_repository → get_file_content → create_pull_request
medium Tool "edit_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "edit_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool edit_file
low Mutating tool "edit_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "edit_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool edit_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "filePath" on "get_file_content"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "get_file_content" takes a path parameter "filePath" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool get_file_content · inputSchema.properties.filePath
low Unconstrained path parameter "filePath" on "edit_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "edit_file" takes a path parameter "filePath" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool edit_file · inputSchema.properties.filePath
Tools 59
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_repositoryingests untrusted inputcreate_pull_requestnetwork egressedit_filewrites filesget_file_contentreads sensitive datacompare_refsno sensitive capabilitycreate_repositoryno sensitive capabilitydecline_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitydelete_repositoryno sensitive capabilityfork_repositoryno sensitive capabilityget_build_statusno sensitive capability
Show 49 more tools ↓
get_code_insightsno sensitive capabilityget_commitno sensitive capabilityget_commit_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilityget_diffno sensitive capabilityget_file_blameno sensitive capabilityget_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityget_pull_request_activityno sensitive capabilityget_pull_request_commitsno sensitive capabilityget_server_infono sensitive capabilityget_tagno sensitive capabilityget_user_profileno sensitive capabilitylist_branch_restrictionsno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_commit_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_dashboard_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_default_reviewer_conditionsno sensitive capabilitylist_forksno sensitive capabilitylist_gpg_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_merge_checksno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_repositoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_repository_hooksno sensitive capabilitylist_reviewer_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_secret_scanning_rulesno sensitive capabilitylist_ssh_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymanage_branchesno sensitive capabilitymanage_commentno sensitive capabilitymanage_commit_commentsno sensitive capabilitymanage_deploymentsno sensitive capabilitymanage_gpg_keysno sensitive capabilitymanage_labelsno sensitive capabilitymanage_merge_checksno sensitive capabilitymanage_repository_hooksno sensitive capabilitymanage_reviewno sensitive capabilitymanage_reviewer_groupsno sensitive capabilitymanage_ssh_keysno sensitive capabilitymanage_tagsno sensitive capabilitymanage_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymerge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_emoticonsno sensitive capabilitysearch_usersno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityupload_attachmentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (59 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @upendra_sengar/bitbucket-server-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Bitbucket Server 24
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 25 side by side →
MCP server for Bitbucket — manage pull requests, branches, and repositories from any MCP client
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Bitbucket Cloud and Server API integration
MCP server for Bitbucket Cloud — read and manage pull requests, branches, and repositories from any MCP client
MCP server for Bitbucket API integration - supports both Cloud and Server
A Model Context Protocol server for Bitbucket with read-only operations
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