Untitledfinancial Dpx MCP Server
@untitledfinancial/dpx-mcp
npm
v2.5.9
Published by @untitledfinancial — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Settlement rail native to AI agents — 76 MCP tools for payments, AML screening, FATF R16 compliance, x402 intelligence, ESG scoring, FX corridors, Mercury banking, Ramp integration, and more. No API key. Works with Claude Desktop and Cursor.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`index.js:1098`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await axios.post(`https://policy.untitledfinancial.com/policy/${policy_id}/check`, { amount, purpose }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
computer_use.paynetwork egressinvoice.createnetwork egresssettlement.nlnetwork egresscompliance.sfdr_screenno sensitive capabilitycompute.cascadeno sensitive capabilitycompute.commodityno sensitive capabilitycompute.energyno sensitive capabilitycompute.macro_timingno sensitive capabilitycompute.shippingno sensitive capabilitycompute.sovereign_riskno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
compute.supply_chainno sensitive capabilityesg.scoreno sensitive capabilityfees.compareno sensitive capabilityfees.scheduleno sensitive capabilityfees.verifyno sensitive capabilityinvoice.getno sensitive capabilityinvoice.payno sensitive capabilityoracle.myceliumno sensitive capabilityoracle.railsno sensitive capabilityoracle.stabilityno sensitive capabilityoracle.statusno sensitive capabilitypolicy.auditno sensitive capabilitypolicy.checkno sensitive capabilitypolicy.createno sensitive capabilityprotocol.investment_contextno sensitive capabilityprotocol.manifestno sensitive capabilitysettlement.executeno sensitive capabilitysettlement.quoteno sensitive capabilitysettlement.statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.5.9 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.5.6 |
A 98/100 | 0 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v2.5.5 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v2.5.4 |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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