Unreal Mcp Cli MCP Server
unreal-mcp-cli
npm
v0.16.0
Source verified
Published by ivanmurzak — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Cross-platform CLI tool for Unreal-MCP (Skills & MCP). Resolves and launches the Unreal editor with MCP connection env vars, runs MCP/system tools over HTTP, probes server health, configures AI agents (Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, …), and manages the Unr
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/bootstrap-local.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/bootstrap-local.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { platform } from 'os'; import { emitProgress } from './progress.js'; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/bootstrap-local.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/close.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/close.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { platform } from 'os'; import { findUProjectFile } from '../utils/projec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/close.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/configure-agent.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/configure-agent.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { downloadServer, resolveServerOverride, SERVER_PATH_ENV_VAR, } from './d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/configure-agent.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/open.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/open.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { platform } from 'os'; import { discoverEngine, invalidateCachedEngine }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/open.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/engine-discovery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/engine-discovery.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { editorBinaryPath, pathFor } from './engine.js'; import { byEngineVersio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/engine-discovery.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/startup-dialog-dismiss.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/startup-dialog-dismiss.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { platform as nodePlatform } from 'os'; export const UNSUPPORTED_PLATFORM
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/startup-dialog-dismiss.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/unreal-build.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/unreal-build.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; const BUILD_CONFIG = { win32: { buildEntrySegments: ['Engine', 'Bina
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/unreal-build.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.16.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.15.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.14.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v0.13.1 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.13.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v0.12.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v0.11.0 |
D 63/100 | 11 | 1.3.1 | 2026-07-21 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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