Unity Mcp Cli MCP Server
unity-mcp-cli
npm
v0.90.0
Source verified
Published by ivanmurzak — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Cross-platform CLI tool for AI Game Developer (Skills & MCP). Full AI develop and test loop. Efficient token usage, advanced tools. Creates Unity project, installs plugins, configures tools, and manages HTTP connection with Unity Editor and a game made wi
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/update.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { platform } from 'os'; import * as ui from '../utils/ui.js'; import { fe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/update.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/browser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/browser.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { verbose } from './ui.js'; /** * Open a URL in the user's default brows
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/browser.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/launch-error-dismiss.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/launch-error-dismiss.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { platform as nodePlatform } from 'os'; import { verbose } from './ui.js'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/launch-error-dismiss.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/managed-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/managed-server.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { MACHINE_STORE_DIR_NAME } from './machine-credentials.js'; import { reso
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/managed-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/unity-editor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/unity-editor.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { homedir, platform } from 'os'; import { findUnityHub, ensureUnityHub, l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/unity-editor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/unity-hub.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/unity-hub.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { platform } from 'os'; import { get as httpsGet } from 'https'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/unity-hub.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/unity-process.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/unity-process.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eSync, execSync } from 'child_process'; import { platform } from 'os'; import * as path from 'path'; import { verbose }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/unity-process.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/unity-shutdown.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/unity-shutdown.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; import { platform as nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/unity-shutdown.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/utils/manifest.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/manifest.js:43`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://package.openupm.com/${packageId}`, { signal: controller.signal,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/manifest.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/unity-hub.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/unity-hub.js:121`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mountOutput = execSync(`hdiutil attach -nobrowse -noverify "${dmgPath}"`, { encoding: 'utf-8' });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/unity-hub.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.90.0 latest |
B 88/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.89.0 |
B 88/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.88.0 |
B 88/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v0.87.0 |
B 88/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.86.3 |
B 88/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v0.86.2 |
B 88/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.86.1 |
B 88/100 | 10 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v0.86.0 |
F 57/100 | 12 | 1.3.1 | 2026-07-21 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan unity-mcp-cli --onlineMore in Content Management
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