Unified Github — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "unified-github-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "unified-github-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "unified-github-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 74,
"threatScore": 78,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"gateCap": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 22,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 1,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 22
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [
"1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C"
],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded GitHub token in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"description": "A hardcoded GitHub token (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `dist/index.js:46`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "GitHub token: ghp_…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "github-token",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 46
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "switch_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_repositories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_repository",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_repository",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_repository",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_organizations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_organization",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_org_members",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_pull_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_pull_request",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_pull_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_gists",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_gist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f0eee64a7db64aae83d0c34137185e109d87240250f7119d6b80db37bb84c4bf",
"stats": {
"tools": 24,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}