Underground Cultural District MCP Server
@underground-cultural-district/mcp-server
npm
v4.7.0
Published by @underground-cultural-district — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Underground Cultural District MCP Server (HTTP/SSE) — 200+ products / 20+ shops / 40+ free. $SPINE membership token live on Base (contract 0x6f75e089e134e7c4Aea629aDaC73d814630f3b07).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([browse-underground]) co-exist with external-action tools ([agent-mesh]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [browse-underground] → sinks [agent-mesh]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow browse-underground → agent-mesh
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/index.js:44`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://substratesymposium.com/api/products.json"); if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.js
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
agent-meshnetwork egressbrowse-undergroundingests untrusted inputagent-identityno sensitive capabilitybuild-cronno sensitive capabilitybuy-from-undergroundno sensitive capabilityconvert-eth-unitsno sensitive capabilityconvert-timestampno sensitive capabilitydecode-base64no sensitive capabilitydecode-jwtno sensitive capabilityencode-base64no sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
encode-urlno sensitive capabilityformat-jsonno sensitive capabilitygenerate-hashno sensitive capabilitygenerate-passwordno sensitive capabilitygenerate-uuidno sensitive capabilitypet-rock-lobsterno sensitive capabilitysearch-undergroundno sensitive capabilitytest-regexno sensitive capabilityUnderground Cultural District MCP Serverno sensitive capabilityvalidate-walletno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.7.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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