Youtube (umbertotancorre) MCP Server
@umbertotancorre/youtube-mcp
npm
v1.1.1
Published by @umbertotancorre — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for YouTube transcripts, metadata, search, and downloads
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("os")); var child_process_1 = require("child_process"); var fs_1 = __importDefault(require("fs")); v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "download_video"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "download_video" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool download_video · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "download_audio"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "download_audio" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool download_audio · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "download_transcript"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "download_transcript" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool download_transcript · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "download_transcript_timed"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "download_transcript_timed" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool download_transcript_timed · inputSchema.properties.url
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@umbertotancorre/youtube-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "const{helpers}=require('ytdlp-nodejs');const d=helpers.BIN_DIR;Promise.all([helpers.downloadYtDlp(d),helpers.downloadFFmpeg(d)]).catch(e=>{console.erro
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @umbertotancorre/youtube-mcp
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_audioingests untrusted inputdownload_transcriptingests untrusted inputdownload_transcript_timedingests untrusted inputdownload_videoingests untrusted inputget_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_transcriptno sensitive capabilityget_transcript_timedno sensitive capabilityget_transcript_timestampsno sensitive capabilityget_video_metadatano sensitive capabilitysearch_in_transcriptno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
search_transcriptno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.1.0 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @umbertotancorre/youtube-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Youtube 20
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 21 side by side →
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Citation-ready YouTube transcripts, comments, and channel intelligence for AI agents over MCP
MCPサーバーとして、YouTube動画の字幕を取得できるツールです。
YouTube MCP Server Implementation
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