Ultimate Unreal Engine MCP Server

ultimate-unreal-engine-mcp npm v0.1.25

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

MCP server giving AI assistants full access to Unreal Engine 5.7 projects

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 92/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 6

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([ue_read_config]) and tools that can send data out ([ue_spawn_actor]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [ue_read_config] → sinks [ue_spawn_actor]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow ue_read_config → ue_spawn_actor

high Tool "ue_spawn_actor" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ue_spawn_actor" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ue_spawn_actor

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/editor/index.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/editor/index.js:123`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ibe('The actor class to spawn (e.g., AStaticMeshActor)'), location: z.object({ x: z.number()

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/tools/editor/index.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/execFileNoThrow.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/execFileNoThrow.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; /** * Invoke a subprocess using array-form execFile and return its output. * N

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/utils/execFileNoThrow.js

low Mutating tool "ue_spawn_actor" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "ue_spawn_actor" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool ue_spawn_actor

low Unconstrained path parameter "config_file" on "ue_read_config"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "ue_read_config" takes a path parameter "config_file" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool ue_read_config · inputSchema.properties.config_file

Tools 130

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • ue_read_configreads sensitive data
  • ue_spawn_actorruns code / shell
  • ue_actor_materialsno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_blueprint_nodeno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_blueprint_variableno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_functionno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_includeno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_input_bindingno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_keyframeno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_known_issueno sensitive capability
Show 120 more tools ↓
  • ue_add_propertyno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_render_jobno sensitive capability
  • ue_add_sequence_trackno sensitive capability
  • ue_batch_importno sensitive capability
  • ue_buildno sensitive capability
  • ue_check_blueprintno sensitive capability
  • ue_cleanup_screenshotsno sensitive capability
  • ue_configure_render_outputno sensitive capability
  • ue_connect_blueprint_pinsno sensitive capability
  • ue_control_livelink_subjectno sensitive capability
  • ue_control_render_queueno sensitive capability
  • ue_convert_actorno sensitive capability
  • ue_cpp_exposed_membersno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_blueprintno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_curveno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_data_assetno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_input_actionno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_material_instanceno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_sequenceno sensitive capability
  • ue_delete_actorno sensitive capability
  • ue_duplicate_actorsno sensitive capability
  • ue_editor_stateno sensitive capability
  • ue_execute_pcg_graphno sensitive capability
  • ue_export_meshno sensitive capability
  • ue_find_blueprint_subclassesno sensitive capability
  • ue_find_class_fileno sensitive capability
  • ue_fly_throughno sensitive capability
  • ue_focus_actorno sensitive capability
  • ue_generate_classno sensitive capability
  • ue_get_build_errorsno sensitive capability
  • ue_get_class_hierarchyno sensitive capability
  • ue_get_component_boundsno sensitive capability
  • ue_get_selectionno sensitive capability
  • ue_import_fbxno sensitive capability
  • ue_import_usdno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_anim_blueprintno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_behavior_treeno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_blackboardno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_blend_spaceno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_eqsno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_gameplay_effectno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_geometry_collectionno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_metasoundno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_montageno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_pcg_graphno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_physics_assetno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_replicationno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_sessionno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_sound_cueno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_state_treeno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_streaming_sourcesno sensitive capability
  • ue_inspect_transition_logicno sensitive capability
  • ue_iterate_sceneno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_abilitiesno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_actorsno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_animation_assetsno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_blueprintsno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_input_actionsno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_input_contextsno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_known_issuesno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_livelink_sourcesno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_livelink_subjectsno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_pcg_graphsno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_pluginsno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_render_queueno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_replicated_propertiesno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_scene_statesno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_sequence_tracksno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_sound_assetsno sensitive capability
  • ue_look_atno sensitive capability
  • ue_manage_data_layersno sensitive capability
  • ue_manage_physical_materialno sensitive capability
  • ue_manage_physics_cacheno sensitive capability
  • ue_manage_remote_controlno sensitive capability
  • ue_material_paramsno sensitive capability
  • ue_orbit_reviewno sensitive capability
  • ue_pie_game_stateno sensitive capability
  • ue_pie_logsno sensitive capability
  • ue_pie_startno sensitive capability
  • ue_pie_stopno sensitive capability
  • ue_preview_livelink_datano sensitive capability
  • ue_query_assetsno sensitive capability
  • ue_query_audio_insightsno sensitive capability
  • ue_query_gameplay_tagsno sensitive capability
  • ue_query_navmeshno sensitive capability
  • ue_query_pcg_resultsno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_attribute_setno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_blueprintno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_blueprint_graphno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_cloth_paramsno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_collisionno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_cpp_classno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_level_layoutno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_net_driverno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_retarget_mappingsno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_uprojectno sensitive capability
  • ue_read_world_partitionno sensitive capability
  • ue_rebuildno sensitive capability
  • ue_reset_destructionno sensitive capability
  • ue_select_actorsno sensitive capability
  • ue_sequence_playbackno sensitive capability
  • ue_set_actor_propertyno sensitive capability
  • ue_set_blueprint_defaultno sensitive capability
  • ue_set_collisionno sensitive capability
  • ue_set_material_paramno sensitive capability
  • ue_trace_cpp_in_blueprintsno sensitive capability
  • ue_trace_includesno sensitive capability
  • ue_trace_referencesno sensitive capability
  • ue_transform_actorno sensitive capability
  • ue_trigger_hlod_generationno sensitive capability
  • ue_trigger_scene_transitionno sensitive capability
  • ue_validate_assetno sensitive capability
  • ue_validate_folderno sensitive capability
  • ue_validate_projectno sensitive capability
  • ue_viewport_camerano sensitive capability
  • ue_viewport_hires_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • ue_viewport_render_modeno sensitive capability
  • ue_viewport_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • ue_visual_reviewno sensitive capability
  • ue_write_configno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.25 latest A 92/100 6 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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