Ulinkly MCP Server
@ulinkly/mcp-server
npm
v0.1.18
Published by @ulinkly — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
ULink MCP Server — Model Context Protocol server for the ULink REST API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/oauth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/oauth.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { URL } from "node:url"; const FRONTEND_URL = process.env.ULINK_FRONTEND_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/oauth.js
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (dist/auth/oauth.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (a public-by-design (anon/publishable) key — RLS, not secrecy, protects it) appears in `dist/auth/oauth.js:185`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/auth/oauth.js
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_domainno sensitive capabilityauthenticateno sensitive capabilitycheck_auth_statusno sensitive capabilityconfigure_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_api_keyno sensitive capabilitycreate_linkno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_domainno sensitive capabilitydelete_linkno sensitive capabilityget_linkno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
get_link_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_onboarding_statusno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityget_usageno sensitive capabilitylist_api_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_domainsno sensitive capabilitylist_linksno sensitive capabilitylist_plansno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilityrevoke_api_keyno sensitive capabilityupdate_linkno sensitive capabilityupdate_projectno sensitive capabilityverify_domainno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.18 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.1.17 |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @ulinkly/mcp-server --onlineMore in Marketing & Social
Official Abyssfall game info, newsletter double opt-in, and merch reservation tools.
AdCritter ads platform: docs, API reference, app scaffolding, and white-label integration.
Google AdSense MCP Server - Monitor earnings, reports, and account health via Claude/AI
Operational empathy for technical founders + PE/VC operators navigating high-stakes B2B interactions. 28 MCP tools + CLI: ICP scoring, persona simulation, battlecards, deal classification, prospect discovery, investor matching, founder wellness, plus mark
MCP server for Bing Webmaster Tools — SEO site management, URL submission, sitemaps, stats, keywords
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that helps AI agents use Primer Brand (@primer/react-brand) correctly when building GitHub marketing and landing pages.