uimax-mcp
npm
v0.8.0
Published by prembobby39-gif — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
UIMax MCP — Turns Claude Code into a frontend expert that reviews and fixes your UI automatically. Free for Pro plan users.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/lighthouse.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { resolve } from "node:path"; // ──
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/lighthouse.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/browser.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; let browserInstance = null; /** * Find Ch
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/browser.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
crawl_and_reviewingests untrusted inputaccessibility_auditno sensitive capabilityanalyze_codeno sensitive capabilitycapture_consoleno sensitive capabilitycapture_errorsno sensitive capabilitycapture_networkno sensitive capabilitycheck_budgetsno sensitive capabilitycheck_dark_modeno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilitycompare_screenshotsno sensitive capabilitycompare_to_baselineno sensitive capabilityexport_reportno sensitive capabilityget_elementno sensitive capabilityget_review_historyno sensitive capabilityget_review_statsno sensitive capabilitylcp_optimizationno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_auditno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilityperformance_auditno sensitive capabilitypwa_auditno sensitive capabilityquick_reviewno sensitive capabilityresource_analysisno sensitive capabilityresponsive_screenshotsno sensitive capabilityreview_diffno sensitive capabilityreview_uino sensitive capabilitysave_baselineno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilitysecurity_auditno sensitive capabilityselect_optionno sensitive capabilitysemantic_compareno sensitive capabilityseo_auditno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityunused_codeno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan uimax-mcp --online
Official Abyssfall game info, newsletter double opt-in, and merch reservation tools.
AdCritter ads platform: docs, API reference, app scaffolding, and white-label integration.
Google AdSense MCP Server - Monitor earnings, reports, and account health via Claude/AI
Operational empathy for technical founders + PE/VC operators navigating high-stakes B2B interactions. 28 MCP tools + CLI: ICP scoring, persona simulation, battlecards, deal classification, prospect discovery, investor matching, founder wellness, plus mark
MCP server for Bing Webmaster Tools — SEO site management, URL submission, sitemaps, stats, keywords
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that helps AI agents use Primer Brand (@primer/react-brand) correctly when building GitHub marketing and landing pages.