Uemcp (ATDev-Inc) MCP Server

uemcp PyPI v0.1.0

Published by atdev-inc — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Open source MCP server that lets Claude drive Unreal Engine 5 with no plugin to compile

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

high Tool "ue_spawn_actor" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ue_spawn_actor" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ue_spawn_actor

low Mutating tool "ue_spawn_actor" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "ue_spawn_actor" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool ue_spawn_actor

low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bridge.py)MTC-SRC-001

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bridge.py:56`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eal")) try: exec(compile(code, "<harness>", "exec"), {}) finally: sys.modules.pop("unreal", None

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/test_bridge.py

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bridge.py)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bridge.py:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eal")) try: exec(compile(code, "<harness>", "exec"), {}) finally: sys.modules.pop("unreal", None

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/test_bridge.py

Tools 31

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • ue_spawn_actorruns code / shell
  • ue_add_componentno sensitive capability
  • ue_asset_infono sensitive capability
  • ue_assign_materialno sensitive capability
  • ue_console_commandno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_blueprintno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_folderno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_materialno sensitive capability
  • ue_create_material_instanceno sensitive capability
  • ue_delete_assetno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
  • ue_destroy_actorno sensitive capability
  • ue_duplicate_assetno sensitive capability
  • ue_focus_actorno sensitive capability
  • ue_get_actorno sensitive capability
  • ue_get_camerano sensitive capability
  • ue_import_assetno sensitive capability
  • ue_list_actorsno sensitive capability
  • ue_new_levelno sensitive capability
  • ue_open_levelno sensitive capability
  • ue_playno sensitive capability
  • ue_project_infono sensitive capability
  • ue_pythonno sensitive capability
  • ue_save_allno sensitive capability
  • ue_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • ue_search_assetsno sensitive capability
  • ue_set_actor_propertyno sensitive capability
  • ue_set_actor_transformno sensitive capability
  • ue_set_blueprint_defaultno sensitive capability
  • ue_set_camerano sensitive capability
  • ue_statusno sensitive capability
  • ue_stop_playno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.0 latest A 93/100 4 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan uemcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Uemcp 1

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →

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