Typescript (npm) MCP Server
typescript-mcp
npm
v0.0.14
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
> ⚠️ **This project is under active development.** APIs and features may change without notice.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lsp-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lsp-mcp.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "url"; //#region node_modules/.pnp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lsp-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/typescript-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/typescript-mcp.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; //#region src/ts/commands/moveFile.ts function moveFile(project, options) { co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/typescript-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lsp/lspClient.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lsp/lspClient.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { ChildProcess } from "child_process"; import { LSPMessage, TextDocumentPositionParams, PublishDiagnosticsParams,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lsp/lspClient.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lsp/lspProcessPool.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lsp/lspProcessPool.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess } from "node:child_process"; import { createLSPClient, type LSPClient } from "./lspClient.ts"; export interf
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lsp/lspProcessPool.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lsp/lspTypes.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lsp/lspTypes.ts:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { ChildProcess } from "child_process"; import { EventEmitter } from "events"; // LSP Message types export interface LS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lsp/lspTypes.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp/lsp-mcp.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp/lsp-mcp.ts:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { initialize as initializeLSPClient } from "../lsp/lspClient.ts"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp/lsp-mcp.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp/typescript-mcp.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp/typescript-mcp.ts:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { initialize as initializeLSPClient } from "../lsp/lspClient.ts"; const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp/typescript-mcp.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/lsp/lspClient.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/lsp/lspClient.test.ts:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; describe("LSP Client Direct Integration", () => { const projectRoot = process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lsp/lspClient.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/lsp-delete-symbol.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/lsp-delete-symbol.test.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n, ChildProcess } from "child_process"; import { initialize as initializeLSPClient, shutdown as shutdownLSPClient
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/lsp-delete-symbol.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/lsp-document-symbols.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/lsp-document-symbols.test.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n, ChildProcess } from "child_process"; import { initialize as initializeLSPClient, shutdown as shutdownLSPClient
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/lsp-document-symbols.test.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.14 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan typescript-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Typescript 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
MCP server for TypeScript compilation and type checking
MCP server that renames/moves TypeScript files and updates all imports via tsserver
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