Typelets MCP Server
@typelets/mcp
npm
v0.5.1
Published by @typelets — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for Typelets. Wraps the Typelets API as tools an MCP-capable LLM client can call.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_problem, get_workspace, list_workspace_files, read_workspace_file, score_against_rubric, suggest_followup_questions, summarize_recording]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_problem, get_workspace, list_workspace_files, read_workspace_file, score_against_rubric, suggest_followup_questions, summarize_recording] → sinks
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_problem → upload_file
medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool create_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "create_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "create_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool create_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_filewrites filesdelete_filewrites filesget_problemingests untrusted inputget_workspaceingests untrusted inputlist_workspace_filesingests untrusted inputread_workspace_fileingests untrusted inputscore_against_rubricingests untrusted inputsuggest_followup_questionsingests untrusted inputsummarize_recordingingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egress
Show 17 more tools ↓
append_to_fileno sensitive capabilityapply_problem_to_workspaceno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_workspaceno sensitive capabilitydelete_folderno sensitive capabilitydelete_problemno sensitive capabilitydelete_workspaceno sensitive capabilityduplicate_problemno sensitive capabilityedit_problemno sensitive capabilitylist_pending_invitesno sensitive capabilitylist_problemsno sensitive capabilitylist_recordingsno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilitymove_pathno sensitive capabilitysave_problem_to_libraryno sensitive capabilityupdate_fileno sensitive capabilitywhoamino sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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