Typegraph MCP Server
typegraph-mcp
npm
v0.9.56
Source verified
Published by guyowen — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Type-aware codebase navigation for AI coding agents — 14 MCP tools powered by tsserver + oxc
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/install-paths.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/install-paths.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createRequire } from "node:module"; export const PACKAGE_NAME = "typegr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/install-paths.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lsp-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lsp-client.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lsp-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { createRequire } from "node:module"; import { McpServer } from "@modelco
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ts_blast_radiusno sensitive capabilityts_code_actionsno sensitive capabilityts_dead_exportsno sensitive capabilityts_definitionno sensitive capabilityts_dependency_treeno sensitive capabilityts_dependentsno sensitive capabilityts_document_symbolsno sensitive capabilityts_effect_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilityts_find_symbolno sensitive capabilityts_hoverno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
ts_import_cyclesno sensitive capabilityts_layer_hoverno sensitive capabilityts_module_boundaryno sensitive capabilityts_module_exportsno sensitive capabilityts_navigate_tono sensitive capabilityts_project_infono sensitive capabilityts_referencesno sensitive capabilityts_shortest_pathno sensitive capabilityts_subgraphno sensitive capabilityts_symbol_overviewno sensitive capabilityts_trace_chainno sensitive capabilityts_type_infono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.56 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.9.55 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.9.54 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v0.9.52 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v0.9.48 |
B 85/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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