Tyme MCP Server

tyme-mcp npm v0.2.0 Source verified

Published by watarutmnh — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

MCP server for Tyme — control the macOS time tracking app through AI assistants

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/applescript.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/applescript.ts:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ""); } async function exec( args: string[], timeout: number, ): Promise<string> { const proc = Bun.spawn(["osasc

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/applescript.ts

Tools 29

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • get_task_recordsingests untrusted input
  • create_categoryno sensitive capability
  • create_projectno sensitive capability
  • create_recordno sensitive capability
  • create_subtaskno sensitive capability
  • create_taskno sensitive capability
  • delete_categoryno sensitive capability
  • delete_projectno sensitive capability
  • delete_recordno sensitive capability
  • delete_subtaskno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
  • delete_taskno sensitive capability
  • get_daily_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_project_detailno sensitive capability
  • get_range_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_record_detailno sensitive capability
  • get_running_timersno sensitive capability
  • get_selected_objectno sensitive capability
  • get_task_detailno sensitive capability
  • list_categoriesno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_subtasksno sensitive capability
  • list_tasksno sensitive capability
  • start_timerno sensitive capability
  • stop_timerno sensitive capability
  • update_categoryno sensitive capability
  • update_projectno sensitive capability
  • update_recordno sensitive capability
  • update_subtaskno sensitive capability
  • update_taskno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.0 latest A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v0.1.1 A 100/100 1 1.5.0 2026-07-22

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan tyme-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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