Twelvetake Gimp Studio MCP Server
twelvetake-gimp-studio-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.2
Published by twelvetake-studios — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A GIMP 3.x MCP server with structured returns, a compat layer, safety checkpoints, and print/DTF tooling.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "gimp_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "gimp_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool gimp_exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/gimp_mcp/bridge/client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/gimp_mcp/bridge/client.py:126`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: op=P.OP_INFO)) def exec(self, code: str, *, args=None, image=None, undo_group: bool = True, timeout: f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/gimp_mcp/bridge/client.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/gimp_mcp/bridge/gimp_side.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/gimp_mcp/bridge/gimp_side.py:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rebinds it, because exec() makes this dict the __globals__ of every function the agent defines and rebinding wou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/gimp_mcp/bridge/gimp_side.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/gimp_mcp/bridge/launcher.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/gimp_mcp/bridge/launcher.py:132`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _var, None) proc = subprocess.Popen( [exe], env=env, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, # never in
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/gimp_mcp/bridge/launcher.py
low Mutating tool "gimp_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "gimp_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool gimp_exec
Tools 119
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gimp_execruns code / shelladd_alphano sensitive capabilityadd_maskno sensitive capabilityapply_filterno sensitive capabilityapply_maskno sensitive capabilityassign_profileno sensitive capabilitybleed_and_safeno sensitive capabilitybrightness_contrastno sensitive capabilitybucket_fillno sensitive capabilitycheck_fontsno sensitive capability
Show 109 more tools ↓
checkpointno sensitive capabilityclean_for_dtfno sensitive capabilitycolor_atno sensitive capabilitycolor_balanceno sensitive capabilitycolor_to_alphano sensitive capabilityconvert_profileno sensitive capabilitycreate_layerno sensitive capabilitycreate_text_layerno sensitive capabilitycurvesno sensitive capabilitycutout_colorno sensitive capabilitydelete_layerno sensitive capabilitydesaturateno sensitive capabilitydescribe_opno sensitive capabilitydespillno sensitive capabilitydrop_shadowno sensitive capabilityduplicate_layerno sensitive capabilityedge_chokeno sensitive capabilityedge_spreadno sensitive capabilityexport_dtf_pngno sensitive capabilityexport_imageno sensitive capabilityfillno sensitive capabilityflattenno sensitive capabilityforeground_selectno sensitive capabilityfuzzy_selectno sensitive capabilitygang_sheetno sensitive capabilitygaussian_blurno sensitive capabilityget_bitmapno sensitive capabilityget_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilitygradientno sensitive capabilitygroup_addno sensitive capabilitygroup_createno sensitive capabilitygroup_ungroupno sensitive capabilityhalftone_separationno sensitive capabilityhistogramno sensitive capabilityhue_saturationno sensitive capabilityinvertno sensitive capabilityknockout_backgroundno sensitive capabilitylayer_from_fileno sensitive capabilitylevelsno sensitive capabilitylist_brushesno sensitive capabilitylist_checkpointsno sensitive capabilitylist_fontsno sensitive capabilitylist_gegl_opsno sensitive capabilitylist_gradientsno sensitive capabilitylist_imagesno sensitive capabilitylist_palettesno sensitive capabilitylist_patternsno sensitive capabilitylist_proceduresno sensitive capabilitylist_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_shirt_presetsno sensitive capabilitylock_alphano sensitive capabilityluminance_to_alphano sensitive capabilitymerge_downno sensitive capabilitymove_layerno sensitive capabilitynew_imageno sensitive capabilitynormalizeno sensitive capabilityoffset_contentno sensitive capabilityoffset_layerno sensitive capabilityopen_imageno sensitive capabilityoutline_textno sensitive capabilitypaintbrushno sensitive capabilitypencilno sensitive capabilityposterizeno sensitive capabilityprint_geometryno sensitive capabilityread_regionno sensitive capabilityredono sensitive capabilityremove_maskno sensitive capabilityrename_layerno sensitive capabilityreorder_layerno sensitive capabilityreset_namespaceno sensitive capabilityrestoreno sensitive capabilityseam_checkno sensitive capabilityselect_allno sensitive capabilityselect_borderno sensitive capabilityselect_by_colorno sensitive capabilityselect_ellipseno sensitive capabilityselect_featherno sensitive capabilityselect_from_alphano sensitive capabilityselect_from_pathno sensitive capabilityselect_growno sensitive capabilityselect_invertno sensitive capabilityselect_noneno sensitive capabilityselect_rectno sensitive capabilityselect_shrinkno sensitive capabilityselection_to_channelno sensitive capabilityset_active_imageno sensitive capabilityset_bgno sensitive capabilityset_blend_modeno sensitive capabilityset_brushno sensitive capabilityset_fgno sensitive capabilityset_opacityno sensitive capabilityset_paint_opacityno sensitive capabilityset_text_propsno sensitive capabilityset_visibleno sensitive capabilitysoft_proofno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitystroke_selectionno sensitive capabilitysubstitute_fontno sensitive capabilitythresholdno sensitive capabilitythreshold_alphano sensitive capabilityto_grayscaleno sensitive capabilityto_rgbno sensitive capabilitytrim_to_contentno sensitive capabilityundono sensitive capabilityundo_group_beginno sensitive capabilityundo_group_endno sensitive capabilityunsharp_maskno sensitive capabilitywhite_underbaseno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (119 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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