Tweetkit X MCP Server
tweetkit-x
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by nsozturk — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Post, delete & read on X (Twitter) from Python & MCP using your own web session — no paid API.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_replies → import_cookie_from_file → bookmark_tweet. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_replies → import_cookie_from_file → bookmark_tweet
high Shell/command execution in server code (tweetkit_x/cookie.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tweetkit_x/cookie.py:80`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( ["security", "find-generic-password", "-s", slug, "-a",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tweetkit_x/cookie.py
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bookmark_tweetnetwork egressdelete_tweetnetwork egressget_repliesingests untrusted inputget_tweetingests untrusted inputimport_cookie_from_filereads sensitive datalike_tweetnetwork egresspin_tweetnetwork egresspost_notenetwork egresspost_threadnetwork egresspost_tweetnetwork egress
Show 30 more tools ↓
quote_tweetnetwork egressretweetnetwork egressschedule_tweetnetwork egressunbookmark_tweetnetwork egressunlike_tweetnetwork egressunpin_tweetnetwork egressunretweetnetwork egressunschedule_tweetnetwork egressauth_statusno sensitive capabilityblock_userno sensitive capabilitydelete_tweetsno sensitive capabilityfollow_userno sensitive capabilityget_bookmarksno sensitive capabilityget_followersno sensitive capabilityget_followingno sensitive capabilityget_home_timelineno sensitive capabilityget_likersno sensitive capabilityget_my_tweetsno sensitive capabilityget_notificationsno sensitive capabilityget_retweetersno sensitive capabilityget_user_likesno sensitive capabilityget_user_profileno sensitive capabilityget_user_tweetsno sensitive capabilitymute_userno sensitive capabilitysearch_my_tweetsno sensitive capabilitysearch_xno sensitive capabilityset_session_cookieno sensitive capabilityunblock_userno sensitive capabilityunfollow_userno sensitive capabilityunmute_userno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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