Tuteliq MCP Server
@tuteliq/mcp
npm
v4.0.0
Published by @tuteliq — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Tuteliq — 50 AI-powered tools for child safety, fraud detection, synthetic content forensics, identity verification, grooming, bullying, sextortion, document analysis, and content moderation. Interactive UI widgets for Claude, Cursor, and M
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_encryption_key, get_audit_receipt, get_incident]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, test_webhook, regenerate_webhook_secret]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_encryption_key, get_audit_receipt, get_incident] → sinks [create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, test_webhook, regenerate_webhook_secret
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_encryption_key → create_webhook
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "update_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 54
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressget_audit_receiptingests untrusted inputget_encryption_keyingests untrusted inputget_incidentingests untrusted inputregenerate_webhook_secretnetwork egresstest_webhooknetwork egressupdate_webhooknetwork egressbatch_analyzeno sensitive capabilitybatch_review_incidentsno sensitive capability
Show 44 more tools ↓
cancel_verification_sessionno sensitive capabilitycreate_policy_ruleno sensitive capabilitycreate_verification_sessionno sensitive capabilitydelete_account_datano sensitive capabilitydelete_policy_ruleno sensitive capabilityevaluate_policy_rulesno sensitive capabilityexport_account_datano sensitive capabilityget_audit_logsno sensitive capabilityget_breachno sensitive capabilityget_consent_statusno sensitive capabilityget_detection_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_emerging_threatsno sensitive capabilityget_incident_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_incidents_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_intelligence_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_policyno sensitive capabilityget_policy_ruleno sensitive capabilityget_pricingno sensitive capabilityget_pricing_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_risk_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_usage_by_toolno sensitive capabilityget_usage_historyno sensitive capabilityget_usage_monthlyno sensitive capabilityget_usage_quotano sensitive capabilityget_usage_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_verification_sessionno sensitive capabilityget_weekly_digestno sensitive capabilitylist_breachesno sensitive capabilitylist_incidentsno sensitive capabilitylist_policy_rulesno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitylog_breachno sensitive capabilitymoderation_queueno sensitive capabilityrecord_consentno sensitive capabilityrectify_datano sensitive capabilityregister_encryption_keyno sensitive capabilityreset_detection_settingsno sensitive capabilityreview_incidentno sensitive capabilityrevoke_encryption_keyno sensitive capabilityset_policyno sensitive capabilityupdate_breach_statusno sensitive capabilityupdate_detection_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_policy_ruleno sensitive capabilitywithdraw_consentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (54 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.0.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v3.27.0 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v3.26.0 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v3.25.2 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v3.25.1 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v3.25.0 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v3.23.0 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v3.22.2 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v3.21.7 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v3.21.6 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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