Tuningengines Cli MCP Server
tuningengines-cli
npm
v0.4.35
Published by cerebrixos-org — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Tuning Engines CLI, MCP server, and Python agent runtime adapters for governed model, agent, skill, and MCP workflows. Fine-tune open-source LLMs, run inference, manage datasets/evaluations, and connect LangGraph or Temporal while Tuning Engines handles p
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/auth.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: sterAuthCommands; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const client_1 = require("../client"); const config_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/billing.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/billing.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rBillingCommands; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const config_1 = require("../config"); const output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/billing.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/guard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/guard.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: quire("crypto")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const output = __importStar(require("../output")); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/guard.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/smoke/inference-smoke.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/smoke/inference-smoke.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/smoke/inference-smoke.mjs
Tools 111
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
install_mcp_templatereads sensitive dataaccept_insightno sensitive capabilityapply_insightno sensitive capabilityapply_work_session_repairno sensitive capabilityapprove_approvalno sensitive capabilitycall_inferenceno sensitive capabilitycancel_evaluationno sensitive capabilitycancel_jobno sensitive capabilitycatalog_export_statusno sensitive capabilitycomplete_compliance_source_runno sensitive capability
Show 101 more tools ↓
complete_work_sessionno sensitive capabilitycreate_compliance_source_runno sensitive capabilitycreate_datasetno sensitive capabilitycreate_evaluationno sensitive capabilitycreate_jobno sensitive capabilitycreate_runtime_interventionno sensitive capabilitycreate_traceno sensitive capabilitydataset_statusno sensitive capabilitydelete_datasetno sensitive capabilitydelete_modelno sensitive capabilitydeny_approvalno sensitive capabilitydoctor_simulateno sensitive capabilityestimate_evaluationno sensitive capabilityestimate_jobno sensitive capabilityevaluation_statusno sensitive capabilityflush_inference_captureno sensitive capabilitygenerate_policy_draftno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_catalog_modelno sensitive capabilityget_inference_jwtno sensitive capabilityget_inference_tokenno sensitive capabilityinference_capture_showno sensitive capabilityinference_capture_updateno sensitive capabilityinference_usageno sensitive capabilityinvoke_skillno sensitive capabilityjob_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_approvalsno sensitive capabilitylist_catalog_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_compliance_risksno sensitive capabilitylist_datasetsno sensitive capabilitylist_evaluationsno sensitive capabilitylist_evaluatorsno sensitive capabilitylist_inference_feedbackno sensitive capabilitylist_inference_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_initiativesno sensitive capabilitylist_insightsno sensitive capabilitylist_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_mcp_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_outcomesno sensitive capabilitylist_policy_decisionsno sensitive capabilitylist_policy_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_runtime_interventionsno sensitive capabilitylist_runtime_state_referencesno sensitive capabilitylist_skillsno sensitive capabilitylist_supported_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_tenant_resourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_tracesno sensitive capabilitylist_work_sessionsno sensitive capabilitymap_outcomeno sensitive capabilitymodel_statusno sensitive capabilitypreview_work_session_repairno sensitive capabilitypropose_outcomeno sensitive capabilityrecord_inference_feedbackno sensitive capabilityrecord_outcomeno sensitive capabilityregistry_sync_applyno sensitive capabilityregistry_sync_dry_runno sensitive capabilityrender_policy_templateno sensitive capabilityretry_jobno sensitive capabilityretry_tenant_resource_syncno sensitive capabilitysend_agent_messageno sensitive capabilityshow_agentno sensitive capabilityshow_approvalno sensitive capabilityshow_compliance_certificationno sensitive capabilityshow_compliance_evidenceno sensitive capabilityshow_compliance_riskno sensitive capabilityshow_datasetno sensitive capabilityshow_evaluationno sensitive capabilityshow_initiativeno sensitive capabilityshow_insightno sensitive capabilityshow_jobno sensitive capabilityshow_mcp_templateno sensitive capabilityshow_modelno sensitive capabilityshow_policy_decisionno sensitive capabilityshow_registry_syncno sensitive capabilityshow_runtime_interventionno sensitive capabilityshow_runtime_state_referenceno sensitive capabilityshow_traceno sensitive capabilityshow_work_sessionno sensitive capabilitysubmit_compliance_source_resultsno sensitive capabilitytenant_domains_updateno sensitive capabilitytenant_invitation_cancelno sensitive capabilitytenant_resource_createno sensitive capabilitytenant_resource_deleteno sensitive capabilitytenant_resource_listno sensitive capabilitytenant_resource_showno sensitive capabilitytenant_resource_updateno sensitive capabilitytenant_resource_validateno sensitive capabilitytenant_team_disableno sensitive capabilitytenant_team_enableno sensitive capabilitytenant_team_inviteno sensitive capabilitytenant_team_listno sensitive capabilitytenant_team_removeno sensitive capabilitytenant_team_set_inference_roleno sensitive capabilitytest_governance_policyno sensitive capabilityundo_work_session_repairno sensitive capabilityupsert_runtime_state_referenceno sensitive capabilityvalidate_complianceno sensitive capabilityverify_tenant_secret_referenceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (111 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.35 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v0.4.34 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.4.33 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v0.4.31 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v0.4.28 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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