Tui Testing MCP Server
tui-testing-mcp
npm
v0.3.3
Source verified
Published by whit3rabbit — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for testing terminal UIs and interactive CLIs across Rust, Go, Python, Node, and raw binaries
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/security/policy.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/security/policy.js:59`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e(?:.+)?$/, /^--eval(?:=.*)?$/, /^-p(?:.+)?$/, /^--print(?:=.*)?$/, /^-r(?:.+)?$/,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/security/policy.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/security/policy.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/security/policy.js:59`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e(?:.+)?$/, /^--eval(?:=.*)?$/, /^-p(?:.+)?$/, /^--print(?:=.*)?$/, /^-r(?:.+)?$/,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/security/policy.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bridges/microsoft-tui-test/bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/bridges/microsoft-tui-test/bridge.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import * as fs from "node:fs"; import * as path from "node:path"; import { resol
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bridges/microsoft-tui-test/bridge.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/runners/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/runners/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; const MAX_COMMAND_OUTPUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB per stream export { BinaryR
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runners/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security/policy.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/security/policy.js:54`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \.git[=\s]/, /--exec(?:=.*)?$/, ], // Node can eval arbitrary code or load modules node: [ /
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/security/policy.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/security/policy.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/security/policy.test.js:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Policy, "node", ["-r", "child_process"])).toBe(false); expect(isArgvSafe(allowlistPolicy, "node", ["-rchild_proc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/security/policy.test.js
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
assert_at_positionno sensitive capabilityassert_containsno sensitive capabilitybuild_targetno sensitive capabilitycapture_screenno sensitive capabilityclose_sessionno sensitive capabilitydiscover_targetsno sensitive capabilityexpect_textno sensitive capabilityget_cursor_positionno sensitive capabilityget_lineno sensitive capabilityget_screen_regionno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
launch_tuino sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilityresize_sessionno sensitive capabilityrun_microsoft_tui_testno sensitive capabilityrun_target_testsno sensitive capabilitysend_ctrlno sensitive capabilitysend_keysno sensitive capabilitywait_for_screen_changeno sensitive capabilitywait_for_screen_stabilityno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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