Tui MCP Server
tui-mcp
npm
v1.2.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for observing and interacting with TUI applications
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "launch" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "launch" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool launch
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/server.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = await import('child_process') const { dirname, join } = await import('path') const { fileURLToPath } = awa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/session.js:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: i: true }) const p = spawn(cmd, args, { name: 'xterm-256color', cols, rows, cwd: cwd || process.cwd()
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/session.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "launch"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "launch" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool launch · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "launch" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "launch" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool launch
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"tui-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "const fs=require('fs'),path=require('path');try{const p=path.join(path.dirname(require.resolve('node-pty/package.json')),'prebuilds');for(const d of fs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package tui-mcp
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
launchruns code / shellcursorno sensitive capabilitykillno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilityoutputno sensitive capabilityread_regionno sensitive capabilityresizeno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollbackno sensitive capabilitysend_keysno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
send_mouseno sensitive capabilitysend_textno sensitive capabilitysnapshotno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitywait_for_exitno sensitive capabilitywait_for_idleno sensitive capabilitywait_for_textno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.3 latest |
A 91/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.2.2 |
A 91/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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