Baasix MCP Server
@tspvivek/baasix-mcp-server
npm
v0.1.7
Published by @tspvivek — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Baasix Backend-as-a-Service - provides 40+ tools for schema management, CRUD operations with 50+ filter operators, relationships, permissions, files, workflows, and more
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([baasix_list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([baasix_send_notification]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [baasix_list_files] → sinks [baasix_send_notification]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow baasix_list_files → baasix_send_notification
medium Tool "baasix_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "baasix_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool baasix_delete_file
low Mutating tool "baasix_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "baasix_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool baasix_delete_file
Tools 57
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
baasix_delete_filewrites filesbaasix_list_filesreads sensitive databaasix_send_notificationnetwork egressbaasix_add_indexno sensitive capabilitybaasix_auth_statusno sensitive capabilitybaasix_collection_statsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_create_itemno sensitive capabilitybaasix_create_permissionno sensitive capabilitybaasix_create_relationshipno sensitive capabilitybaasix_create_schemano sensitive capability
Show 47 more tools ↓
baasix_delete_itemno sensitive capabilitybaasix_delete_permissionno sensitive capabilitybaasix_delete_relationshipno sensitive capabilitybaasix_delete_schemano sensitive capabilitybaasix_export_schemasno sensitive capabilitybaasix_generate_reportno sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_current_userno sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_file_infono sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_itemno sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_permissionno sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_permissionsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_schemano sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_settingsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_templateno sensitive capabilitybaasix_get_user_tenantsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_import_schemasno sensitive capabilitybaasix_list_itemsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_list_notificationsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_list_permissionsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_list_rolesno sensitive capabilitybaasix_list_schemasno sensitive capabilitybaasix_list_templatesno sensitive capabilitybaasix_loginno sensitive capabilitybaasix_logoutno sensitive capabilitybaasix_mark_notification_seenno sensitive capabilitybaasix_realtime_collectionsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_realtime_configno sensitive capabilitybaasix_realtime_disableno sensitive capabilitybaasix_realtime_enableno sensitive capabilitybaasix_realtime_statusno sensitive capabilitybaasix_refresh_authno sensitive capabilitybaasix_register_userno sensitive capabilitybaasix_reload_permissionsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_remove_indexno sensitive capabilitybaasix_send_inviteno sensitive capabilitybaasix_send_magic_linkno sensitive capabilitybaasix_server_infono sensitive capabilitybaasix_sort_itemsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_switch_tenantno sensitive capabilitybaasix_update_itemno sensitive capabilitybaasix_update_permissionno sensitive capabilitybaasix_update_permissionsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_update_relationshipno sensitive capabilitybaasix_update_schemano sensitive capabilitybaasix_update_settingsno sensitive capabilitybaasix_update_templateno sensitive capabilitybaasix_verify_inviteno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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