Tsdevstack Cli MCP Server
@tsdevstack/cli-mcp
npm
v0.5.0
Published by @tsdevstack — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for tsdevstack CLI - exposes tools and resources to AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; let context; function initContext(ctx) { context = ctx; } function wrapComma
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 54
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_secretreads sensitive datalist_secretsreads sensitive dataadd_bucket_storageno sensitive capabilityadd_messaging_topicno sensitive capabilityadd_serviceno sensitive capabilitycloud_initno sensitive capabilitycloud_secrets_pushno sensitive capabilitycloud_secrets_removeno sensitive capabilitycloud_secrets_setno sensitive capabilitydeploy_kongno sensitive capability
Show 44 more tools ↓
deploy_lbno sensitive capabilitydeploy_schedulerno sensitive capabilitydeploy_schedulersno sensitive capabilitydeploy_serviceno sensitive capabilitydeploy_servicesno sensitive capabilitydiff_secretsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_clientno sensitive capabilitygenerate_docker_composeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_kongno sensitive capabilitygenerate_secretsno sensitive capabilityget_infrastructure_configno sensitive capabilityget_project_configno sensitive capabilityget_service_statusno sensitive capabilityinfra_bootstrapno sensitive capabilityinfra_build_dockerno sensitive capabilityinfra_build_kongno sensitive capabilityinfra_deployno sensitive capabilityinfra_destroyno sensitive capabilityinfra_generateno sensitive capabilityinfra_generate_cino sensitive capabilityinfra_generate_dockerno sensitive capabilityinfra_generate_kongno sensitive capabilityinfra_initno sensitive capabilityinfra_init_cino sensitive capabilityinfra_planno sensitive capabilityinfra_push_dockerno sensitive capabilityinfra_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_deployed_servicesno sensitive capabilitylist_environmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulersno sensitive capabilitylist_servicesno sensitive capabilityplan_db_migrateno sensitive capabilityregister_detached_workerno sensitive capabilityremove_bucket_storageno sensitive capabilityremove_detached_workerno sensitive capabilityremove_messaging_topicno sensitive capabilityremove_schedulerno sensitive capabilityremove_serviceno sensitive capabilityremove_service_cloudno sensitive capabilityrun_db_migrateno sensitive capabilitysyncno sensitive capabilityunregister_detached_workerno sensitive capabilityupdate_messaging_topicno sensitive capabilityvalidate_serviceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (54 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v0.3.1 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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