Trylighthouse MCP Server
@trylighthouse/mcp-server
npm
v0.1.93
Published by @trylighthouse — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for the Lighthouse CRM API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([lighthouse_get_file, lighthouse_reports_get_widget_data]) co-exist with external-action tools ([lighthouse_upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [lighthouse_get_file, lighthouse_reports_get_widget_data] → sinks [lighthouse_upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow lighthouse_get_file → lighthouse_upload_file
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "download_url" on "lighthouse_get_file"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "lighthouse_get_file" takes a URL/host parameter "download_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool lighthouse_get_file · inputSchema.properties.download_url
medium Tool "lighthouse_crm_unlink_note_record" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "lighthouse_crm_unlink_note_record" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool lighthouse_crm_unlink_note_record
medium Tool "lighthouse_unlink_folder_from_record" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "lighthouse_unlink_folder_from_record" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool lighthouse_unlink_folder_from_record
medium Tool "lighthouse_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "lighthouse_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool lighthouse_delete_file
medium Tool "lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record
low Mutating tool "lighthouse_crm_unlink_note_record" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "lighthouse_crm_unlink_note_record" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool lighthouse_crm_unlink_note_record
low Mutating tool "lighthouse_unlink_folder_from_record" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "lighthouse_unlink_folder_from_record" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool lighthouse_unlink_folder_from_record
low Mutating tool "lighthouse_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "lighthouse_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool lighthouse_delete_file
low Mutating tool "lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_id" on "lighthouse_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "lighthouse_delete_file" takes a path parameter "file_id" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool lighthouse_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.file_id
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_id" on "lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record" takes a path parameter "file_id" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool lighthouse_unlink_file_from_record · inputSchema.properties.file_id
Tools 127
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
lighthouse_crm_unlink_note_recordwrites fileslighthouse_delete_filewrites fileslighthouse_get_fileingests untrusted inputlighthouse_reports_get_widget_dataingests untrusted inputlighthouse_unlink_file_from_recordwrites fileslighthouse_unlink_folder_from_recordwrites fileslighthouse_upload_filenetwork egresslighthouse_create_folderno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_add_to_listno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_bulk_add_to_listno sensitive capability
Show 117 more tools ↓
lighthouse_crm_bulk_create_recordsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_bulk_delete_recordsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_bulk_remove_from_listno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_bulk_update_recordsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_bulk_upsert_recordsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_create_attributeno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_create_listno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_create_noteno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_create_note_tagno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_create_optionno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_create_recordno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_create_taskno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_delete_attributeno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_delete_listno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_delete_noteno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_delete_note_tagno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_delete_optionno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_delete_recordno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_delete_taskno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_delete_viewno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_ai_reportno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_attributeno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_attributesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_color_paletteno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_listno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_list_recordsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_noteno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_recordno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_record_activityno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_taskno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_get_viewno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_link_note_recordno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_list_ai_reportsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_list_listsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_list_note_tagsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_list_notesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_list_optionsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_list_tasksno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_list_viewsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_manage_note_tagsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_remove_from_listno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_revoke_list_from_teamsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_revoke_view_from_teamsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_search_notesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_search_recordsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_share_list_with_teamsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_share_view_with_teamsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_attributeno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_listno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_list_sharingno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_noteno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_note_tagno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_recordno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_taskno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_viewno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_update_view_sharingno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_crm_upsert_recordno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_delete_folderno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_attributesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_companyno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_company_signalsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_company_tractionno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_entity_by_nameno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_funding_typesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_industriesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_locationsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_personno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_person_signalsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_saved_searchesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_search_resultsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_get_tagsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_list_optionsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_lookup_by_domainno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_lookup_by_linkedinno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_lookup_people_by_linkedinno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_search_companiesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_search_entitiesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_search_investorsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_search_organizationsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_search_peopleno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_search_schoolsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_semantic_search_companiesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_discovery_semantic_search_peopleno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_calendar_accountsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_calendar_meetingno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_calendar_meeting_notesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_calendar_meeting_transcriptno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_calendar_meetingsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_email_accountsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_email_conversationno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_email_conversationsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_email_create_draftno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_linkedin_accountsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_linkedin_chat_messagesno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_inbox_linkedin_chatsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_link_file_to_recordno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_link_folder_to_recordno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_list_documentsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_list_record_documentsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_create_dashboardno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_create_widgetno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_delete_dashboardno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_delete_widgetno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_get_dashboardno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_list_dashboardsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_list_widgetsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_revoke_dashboard_from_teamsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_share_dashboard_with_teamsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_update_dashboardno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_reports_update_widgetno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_update_fileno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_update_folderno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_workspace_get_teamno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_workspace_get_userno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_workspace_list_teamsno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_workspace_list_usersno sensitive capabilitylighthouse_workspace_meno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (127 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 9
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.93 latest |
A 95/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.1.87 |
A 95/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.1.84 |
A 95/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v0.1.81 |
A 95/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v0.1.77 |
A 95/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Show 4 more versions ↓
v0.1.76 |
A 95/100 | 12 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.1.75 |
A 95/100 | 12 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v0.1.72 |
B 83/100 | 17 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v0.1.70 |
A 91/100 | 5 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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