Trend Pulse — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "trend-pulse",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "trend-pulse"
},
"server": {
"name": "trend-pulse"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 1.2,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: take_snapshot → export_data → send_notification. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "take_snapshot → export_data → send_notification"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"take_snapshot"
],
"sources": [
"export_data"
],
"sinks": [
"send_notification"
],
"path": [
"take_snapshot",
"export_data",
"send_notification"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "take_snapshot",
"to": "export_data",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "export_data",
"to": "send_notification",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded Google API key in server code (src/trend_pulse/plugins/sources/youtube_trending.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded Google API key (a client API key (restricted by referrer/quota, not a private secret)) appears in `src/trend_pulse/plugins/sources/youtube_trending.py:29`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/trend_pulse/plugins/sources/youtube_trending.py"
},
"evidence": "Google API key: AIza…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "google-api-key",
"file": "src/trend_pulse/plugins/sources/youtube_trending.py",
"line": 29
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"trend-pulse\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "trend-pulse"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"take_snapshot"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"export_data"
],
"externalSink": [
"send_notification"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"take_snapshot",
"export_data",
"send_notification"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: take_snapshot → export_data → send_notification."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_trending",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_trends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_sources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trend_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "take_snapshot",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_content_brief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_scoring_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_platform_specs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_review_checklist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_reel_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "render_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_semantic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trend_clusters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_lifecycle_prediction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_sources_extended",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_content_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_ab_variants",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "score_content_hybrid",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_campaign_calendar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trend_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_trends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_data",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"export_data\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_notification",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "adapt_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_viral_factors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_hashtags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_source_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trend_velocity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_score_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "8220d8cdc5c9051f1adb013328d39d48934a9681542f2acc2ac32f5c395664d9",
"stats": {
"tools": 29,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}